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INSPECTION SUMMARY

The Office of Legat, Riyadh, became operational on 02/28/1997, as a result of the November 1995 and June 1996 bombings in Riyadh and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Previously, Legat, Rome, had territorial responsibilities for Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Initially, Saudi Arabia was the only country within Legat, Riyadh's, territorial responsibility, however, due to the proximity and the need for continuity in Legat coverage for the contiguous Gulf States, the countries of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, and Qatar were reassigned to the Legat. Legat personnel operated in a potentially hostile environment due to the known terrorists organizations which had ties throughout the Gulf Region. There was an on-board compliment of one Legat, one ALAT, and one Office Assistant (OA). Management and operations were effective and efficient, however, reasonable and measurable goals and objectives had not been documented. Adequate training was afforded host countries' law enforcement entities and Legat personnel. Outside contacts with 32 representatives of law enforcement and American Embassies throughout the Gulf Region confirmed a strong working relationship with the Legat and staff. Legat Bassam Youssef had established excellent liaison with the Mabathith, the Saudi equivalent of the FBI and was responsible for the first visit by the Mabathith to the U.S. Embassy. Although the workload in Riyadh alone justified their presence full time, representatives throughout the Gulf Region believed that visits by the Legat and ALAT were too infrequent. By agreement with the U.S. Ambassador and [REDACTED] the Legat did not [REDACTED] Investigative programs were ranked as follows: NFIP-IT, WCCP, and VCMOP. The Legat did not conduct any investigations in the NIPCIP, DOMTERR Program, CRP, and the OC/DP. The nature and scope of U.S. based crime problems, with their nexus to the Gulf Region were terrorism matters, due to supporters of Usama Bin Laden throughout the region. The Legat's primary investigative focus had been directed towards the solution of the Khobar Towers bombing. Additionally, based upon Bin Laden's reported involvement in the planning of the East Africa bombings, the Legat had been preoccupied with Bin Laden's current status and whereabouts. Although all funds were accounted for, a deficiency was noted in the Field Support Account (FSA).

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BACKGROUND

The Legat, Riyadh, inspection was conducted under the direction of Inspector-in-Charge Henry E. Ragle, III, from 12/05/1999 through 12/10/1999. Investigative and administrative operations that have occurred since the Legat was opened on 02/27/1997 were reviewed. Additionally, an audit of the FSA was conducted for the same period. This was the first inspection of Legat, Riyadh.

Legat, Riyadh, was originally established as a result of two significant terrorism bombing investigations in Riyadh and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. When the bombings occurred in November 1995 and June 1996, Legat, Rome, had territorial responsibilities for Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. The increase in FBI investigative activity precipitated a permanent presence in the region. Initially, Saudi Arabia was the only country within Legat, Riyadh's, territorial responsibility. However, the proximity to other countries in the Persian Gulf and their connectivity prompted a realignment of territorial responsibilities. Legat, Riyadh, assumed operational, training, and liaison responsibilities for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen.

The countries covered by Legat, Riyadh, were culturally diverse but united by language, religion, and economic prosperity from massive crude oil reserves. Legat, Riyadh, encompassed an area of approximately 2.8 million square kilometers with a population of approximately 47 million people. Many of the countries in the region had long standing border disputes, and the territory had experienced terrorist activity connected to Hizballah, Hamas, Abu Nidal, Al-Qaeda, and Usama Bin Laden.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupied an area larger than one-fifth the size of the United States. A vast majority of the country was uninhabited and the terrain was desert. Saudi Arabia encompassed nearly 1.9 million square kilometers and had a population of approximately 21.5 million people. The primary language of the monarchy government was Arabic and virtually the entire population were Muslim. Saudi petroleum reserves were the largest in the world, which supported a robust oil-based economy.

Kuwait was slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, but enjoyed a strategic location in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Kuwait, primarily desert plain, had a land area of approximately 18,000 square kilometers and a population of two million. Bahrain had a population of 629,000 and a land area of 620 square kilometers, approximately three times the size of Washington, D.C. Oman was approximately 212,460 square kilometers or slightly smaller than the state of Kansas, with a population of approximately 2.5 million. Oman was located at

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the base of the Musandam Peninsula and adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz which was a vital transit point for crude oil. Qatar is primarily a barren dessert, smaller than the size of Connecticut, with a land area of 11,437 square miles and a population of approximately 723,000. United Arab Emirates was slightly smaller than the state of Maine, at 82,880 square kilometers, with a population of 2.3 million. Yemen was slightly larger than twice the size of the state of Wyoming at 527,970 square kilometers and a population of approximately 17 million.

The FY 2000 Agent FSL was two. The Legat and ALAT were on board at the time of the inspection. The support FSL was one OA, who was also on board at the time of inspection. Legat Youssef was fluent in Arabic and both ALAT Wilfred Rattigan and OA Jannet H. Hardee possessed limited knowledge of the Arabic language. Despite the staff's limited ability to speak in the language native to the region, the general knowledge of English in the region permitted the Legat's office to communicate effectively.

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EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT

Legat Youssef opened Legat, Riyadh, on 02/28/1997, and served as the Legat throughout the inspection period. He was initially responsible only for Saudi Arabia, but soon recognized the need for continuity in Legat coverage for the contiguous Gulf States, including the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, and Qatar. As a result of his insights and initiative, these countries were reassigned from Legat, Rome, to Legat, Riyadh. Prior to his assignment in Riyadh, Legat Youssef served as an SA in the St. Louis and Los Angeles Divisions, where he specialized in terrorism matters. He served in a TDY capacity in Rome, Brussels, and Paris, which assisted in preparing him for this assignment. Legat Youssef directly supervised an ALAT and an OA, and was responsible for the development of liaison with government, intelligence, and law enforcement entities within the Legat territory. He was successful in establishing an excellent relationship with the Mabathith, the Saudi Arabian counterpart of the FBI. Of particular significance, was the unprecedented visit to the U.S. Embassy by the Director of Liaison for the Mabathith, at the invitation of Legat Youssef. This was accomplished within three months of assuming his post. His efforts led to the establishment of direct communications with senior officials of the Mabathith, which had previously been unavailable to any U.S. Embassy personnel. He developed an organizational structure for the office, established administrative and operational controls and procedures, and provided adequate administrative oversight and direction to the other assigned personnel. He provided guidance and training to the numerous TDY SAs assigned to the office, as well as to the newly assigned ALAT. He was a member of the Emergency Action Committee and the Counterintelligence Working Group, and also attended weekly staff meetings and Country Team meetings. The Legat or ALAT attended bi-monthly Force Protection meetings to discuss issues concerning the security of armed forces personnel. His Arabic language ability greatly enhanced his effectiveness in dealing with officials of host countries in the Legat territory. Ambassador Wyche Fowler called Legat Youssef a superior representative for the FBI, and noted that he was "just the right man" for this position. The Deputy Chief of Mission in Riyadh, Albert Thibault, Jr., stated that Legat Youssef had done a great job, possessed excellent interpersonal skills, and was very reasonable. His subordinates described him as having an open-door policy, and as a responsive and hands-on manager.

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STAFFING

ALAT Rattigan was assigned to Legat, Riyadh, on 02/03/1999. He was previously assigned to the New York Division from 03/10/1988 through 02/02/1999. ALAT Rattigan routinely interacted with other embassy personnel and was universally commended for his helpfulness and responsiveness. The inspection determined that ALAT Rattigan began studying the Arabic language and had impressed local law enforcement officials with his knowledge of the Arabic culture and language. The Legat described the ALAT as a capable individual and noted his positive attitude and work ethic. The OA enjoyed working with the ALAT and commended his professionalism and his open and positive demeanor. ALAT Rattigan consistently contributed to the successful operation of the Legat's office.

Former ALAT Mark Sofia was assigned to the Legat, Riyadh, from 02/14/1997 through 01/24/1999. Former ALAT Sofia's participation in a significant public corruption investigation while assigned to the Chicago Division, required his intermittent return for pretrial preparation and testimony. The inspection determined that although former ALAT Sofia made positive contributions, his absence from Riyadh for approximately eleven months of his two year assignment had a negative impact upon the Legat's investigative efforts.

The following SAs were assigned TDY to Legat, Riyadh: Michael L. O'Leary, 11/14/1997 through 03/21/1998; Joseph Manarang, 08/29/1998 through 10/27/1998; and Beth Dawn Babyak, 09/20/1999 through 12/12/1999.

Diane S. Edge served as the OA from 08/03/1997 through 08/08/1999. She was previously assigned to the Atlanta Division. During her tenure as OA, she was assisted by three TDY support personnel.

OA Hardee assumed the OA responsibilities in Riyadh on 07/28/1999. She previously served as an OA in Paris and Rome. As an experienced OA, she was assigned clerical, secretarial, and financial duties as well as the automation support and Communications Security (COMSEC) responsibilities. Since women were not permitted to drive in Saudi Arabia, the OA coordinated transportation for the Legat's family as well as transportation for TDY personnel.

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ADMINISTRATION

The Legat Office operated in a potentially hostile environment which required appropriate concern for the physical safety of all embassy employees. Awareness of security concerns was especially evident as a result of the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 and the earlier bombing of the Office of Personnel Management, Saudi Arabian National Guard, both of which resulted in deaths of American servicemen. Security precautions had been instituted by the Legat, Riyadh, which included the procurement of two armored vehicles assigned to the Legat and ALAT. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) provided regular briefings to all embassy personnel regarding security, and the Legat or ALAT attended bi-monthly Force Protection meetings at the embassy to discuss the threat assessment to U.S. military personnel in the region. The Legat was also a member of the Emergency Action Committee.

Legat Youssef was responsible for establishing and organizing the operation of the newly opened Legat office. He ensured the effectiveness of administrative operations through direct supervision and proper delegation of administrative responsibilities to his subordinates. Throughout the inspection period, he supervised a number of TDY personnel and coordinated the travel of personnel who participated in the Khobar Towers bombing case. His supervision of the Legat office was enhanced by his language ability and knowledge of regional culture. The small size of the office permitted him to regularly discuss administrative, operational, and program issues with all Legat personnel. He reviewed and assigned leads and covered the ALAT's responsibilities during lengthy periods of absence. Legat Youssef was obliged to personally address numerous requests for assistance from field offices and FBIHQ due to the heavy workload and significance of the Khobar Towers investigation. The inspection determined that the Legat had established and provided appropriate administrative supervision of COMSEC, mail handling, records maintenance, and security matters.

When Riyadh was initially opened, it was only responsible for the country of Saudi Arabia. Legat Youssef recommended that responsibility for six other Gulf States contiguous to Saudi Arabia be added to the responsibilities of the Legat, Riyadh. These countries included the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Yemen, and Qatar. These countries shared a commonality of language, culture, and geographic connectivity which suggested that placing these countries under the same Legat would be beneficial to investigative efforts in the region. Early on in his assignment, Legat Youssef established relationships with members of the Mabathith, the Saudi equivalent of the FBI, which was unprecedented. Even more noteworthy was the visit of the Director of Liaison and Sensitive Operations of the Mabathith and his deputy to the Legat office. No members of the Mabathith had ever visited the embassy prior to this occasion. Legat Youssef also established a favorable relationship with the Director of the Naif

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Arab Academy for Security Sciences (NAASS). As a result, the Legat was invited to present a seminar on money laundering at the Academy to high-level banking officials of the Al-Rajehi Bank, the largest bank in Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the liaison contacts in Saudi Arabia, Legat Youssef developed an impressive liaison base of prominent law enforcement officials in the Legat territory. These included the Director of the Abu Dhabi Police, the Commandant General of the Dubai Police Force, and the Director of State Security in the UAE; the Director of Kuwait State Security and the Director of the Criminal Investigative Directorate of Kuwait; and the Director General of the Bahraini Criminal Investigative Directorate.

Legat Youssef voiced strong support for the EEO Program and EAP during his meetings with employees, as well as, in informal settings. At the time of the inspection, the Legat, who was himself of Middle Eastern heritage, supervised a minority ALAT and a female OA. Throughout the inspection period, he supervised a number of TDY personnel of various racial and ethnic backgrounds. The Legat devoted time to educating each employee regarding the characteristics and sensitivities of the culture of the region. Legat Youssef encouraged two employees to seek assistance from the EAP, FBIHQ.

The inspection determined that the FSA account had not been properly reconciled for over a year at the time of the inspection. The Inspector issued an instruction to correct this deficiency.

The inspection determined that file reviews, Performance Summary Assessments (PSAs) and progress reviews were not conducted by the Legat throughout the inspection period. The Inspector issued instructions to the Legat to establish procedures and ensure file reviews were conducted, as well as, PSAs and progress reviews. In addition, the Legat had not conducted a required property inventory as directed by FBIHQ, property listed on the Master Property List was not accounted for, and property was found in inventory which was not included on the list. The Inspector issued instructions to the Legat and FD-HQ to correct these deficiencies.

The inspection determined that Legat, Riyadh, had not established reasonable and measurable goals and objectives. The Inspector recommended that Legat, Riyadh, formulate and document such goals and objectives.

Legat Youssef had not conducted regular visits to the six countries, which were included in the Legat territory. This resulted in the lack of coordination and liaison with embassy personnel, as well as, limited liaison contacts with law enforcement agencies in those

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countries. In particular, relations with embassy personnel in Yemen were found to be strained and ineffective as the result of the lack of a presence by Legat personnel. The inspection further noted that operations would have benefited from a division of responsibilities between the Legat and ALAT. The inspection noted some difficulties experienced by the Legat were the result of overextension of geographic responsibilities, and operations would have benefitted by reassignment of certain countries to other Legats. The inspection noted operations would have benefitted from visits to the embassies in the Legat territory by FBIHQ personnel. While FBIHQ personnel had visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, these visits were related to specific case matters, including the KHOBOMB investigation, and were not related to a review of Legat operations. The Inspector made recommendations regarding these matters to the Legat, Riyadh, and Investigative Support Division (ISD-HQ).

The inspection found that the efficiency of the Legat operations was adversely affected by inadequate office space which was not located in a Controlled Access Area (CAA). Plans were underway to move to new space, but these efforts had taken an inordinate amount of time, and no date for relocation was scheduled at the time of the inspection. The Inspector recommended that the Legat and ISD-HQ aggressively pursue efforts to secure suitable office space for the Legat.

The inspection noted that a Technical Security Countermeasures (TSCM) inspection had not been conducted for over two years. One of the reasons cited for the delay was the anticipated move to new office space in a CAA. A TSCM inspection had been conducted in May 1999. The Inspector provided the Legat with a routing slip setting forth the need for annual TSCM inspections.

LIAISON

The Legat established and maintained effective liaison with law enforcement entities for the purpose of supporting its investigative mission. Liaison contacts with each of the host countries were viewed as excellent. Liaison contacts within the local police and security forces were noteworthy in Saudi Arabia. By agreement with the U.S. Ambassador and [REDACTED] (S) A the Legat, Riyadh, [REDACTED] (S) in host countries during the inspection period.

The liaison contacts were extensive and well documented. The Legat, Riyadh, maintained contact with law enforcement and security representatives within each of his assigned countries. Those contacts consisted of representatives from the Mabahith, Saudi Arabia; [REDACTED] C

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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] The Legat's primary liaison contact was with the Mabathith and the NASS in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Legat, Riyadh, had limited contact with the [REDACTED] (S) C
[REDACTED] This was determined to be the [REDACTED] The Legat, Riyadh,

[REDACTED] offered training to each of the police and security organizations within its territory. Law enforcement officials from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia received training from the Legat office, consisting of counterterrorism, WCC, money laundering, major case management, and interview and interrogation.

Representatives from various police forces confirmed that a positive working relationship existed with Legat, Riyadh. The Mabathith cited several instances in which investigative assistance had been rendered by Legat, Riyadh. Major General Abdul Aziz Al-Huwairini, Director of Liaison, Mabathith, indicated that the FBI was the only western law enforcement agency having direct liaison with his office, and characterized the relationship with the FBI as exceptional. As a result of the Khobar Towers bombing, the relationship between the FBI and Mabathith improved tremendously. General Al-Huwairini commented that the Minister of the Interior had instructed him to cooperate fully with the Legat office.

The Director of Liaison for the Government of Oman stated that the level of cooperation between Legat, Riyadh, and his government was excellent, and that his government would like to establish direct contact with the Legat, rather than having to interface with the RSO. The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, UAE, also expressed a preference to have direct contact with the FBI. He commented that the FBI did a very good job in the region.

Sheikh Mashal Al-Jarrah Al Sabbaah, Director of the KSS, characterized his relationship with the FBI as "strong" and "built on mutual trust." The Sheikh referred to the Legat as one of his trusted advisors, which he defined as a cadre of people that he felt comfortable to consult with on numerous matters. The Sheikh considered the FBI to be partners with the KSS. He prominently displayed a photograph of himself, the Minister of the Interior Mohammed Al-Sabaah and Director Freeh.

Lieutenant Colonel Saad Mohammuni of the Qatari SSI described the relationship between the SSI and the Legat, Riyadh, as excellent. He noted that Legat, Riyadh, had arranged for two officers from the SSI to attend the NA, but they were unable to pass the physical

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requirements. Efforts were pending to identify other officers to replace these candidates. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammuni expressed a strong desire for the FBI to establish a separate Legat office in Qatar.

During the inspection, a total of 32 individuals were contacted to include key staff members at each American Embassy within the Legat's territory to assess the efforts of the Legat, Riyadh. Legat Youssef was well respected and was considered an integral member of the country team in Riyadh. Ambassador Fowler characterized Legat Youssef as a superb representative of the FBI and indicated that the Legat had been highly successful in the Khobar Towers bombing investigation. The Ambassador commented that [REDACTED] and Legat Youssef worked very well together. Ambassador Fowler characterized the Legat as the right person for the Legat position. The Deputy Chief of Mission, Al Thibault, Jr., characterized the Legat as an individual with excellent skills, very reasonable, and especially outstanding in his ability to deal with people. The RSO characterized his relationship with the Legat office as excellent.

Favorable comments were expressed by other Ambassadors and staff members within the Legat's territory. Ambassador John Craig, U.S. Embassy, Muscat, Oman, advised that he enjoyed an excellent relationship with Legat Youssef. Ambassador Craig advised that the Legat's point of contact within the embassy was RSO Edwin Guard. RSO Guard advised that he had a meaningful and productive relationship with Legat, Riyadh, and that Legat Youssef had an excellent relationship with local law enforcement in Oman.

The U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Johnny Young, advised that his office enjoyed a fine relationship with the Legat, Riyadh. He noted that interaction between the Legat and embassy personnel was conducted freely and without restrictions. [REDACTED] described his relationship with Legat, Riyadh, as being very good, and stated that Legat Youssef responded to matters in a timely manner. [REDACTED] advised that the relationship could be enhanced if Legat Youssef visited the territory on a more frequent basis.

The U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, characterized her relationship with the FBI as very good. The Ambassador explained that she dealt directly with the Washington Field Office (WFO), following their involvement in a kidnapping matter in Yemen in 1998. She had limited contacts with the Legat, Riyadh, and considered her contacts with the WFO preeminent to her relationship with the Legat. She viewed the Legat, Riyadh, as a "facilitator" and opted to deal with the FBI through WFO. She welcomed the Legat to Yemen for investigative purposes, but enjoyed a close relationship with WFO, based on their continued efforts to assist in several kidnapping matters.

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The U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, James Larocco, described the relationship between his embassy and the Legat as "fine," which he stated was not made in a pejorative manner. The Ambassador added that the frequency of the contacts between the Legat and himself were appropriate for the volume of activity in the region. The Ambassador had not met the ALAT until they were introduced on 12/07/1999. The Ambassador said that he was a firm believer in the "team" concept and acknowledged that the Legat was a valued part of that team.

Based upon the numerous contacts within the Legat's territory, it was determined Legat, Riyadh, had established positive and valuable relationships with the numerous law enforcement agencies within its territory. The Legat provided noteworthy support to international law enforcement efforts, especially in the area of cooperation and unprecedented access to information from host countries involving the Khobar Towers investigation. Legat, Riyadh, had not conducted regular visits to all of the six countries which were included in the Legat territory. This resulted in lack of coordination and liaison with embassy personnel, as well as limited liaison contacts with law enforcement agencies in those countries. The inspection recommended that the Legat contact each Ambassador to enhance liaison and operational effectiveness. It was also recommended that the territory be divided between the Legat and ALAT, and the Legat pursue accreditation with the Ambassador in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for each country within the Legat's territory.

INVESTIGATIONS

Legat, Riyadh, prioritized its investigative programs as NFIP-IT, WCCP, and VCMOP. The Legat did not conduct any investigations in the NIPCIP, DOMTERR Program, CRP, and the OC/DP. The Legat conducted a limited number of AP investigations. NFIP-IT matters were identified as the first investigative priority, based on the volume of leads received in the FCI and INTERR subprograms. The large number of leads were attributed to the Legat's strategic location in the Middle East. The second investigative priority was WCC, based upon the volume of leads received from field divisions pertaining to fraud and related financial matters. The third priority was listed as VCMO, due to the number of international parental kidnaping leads.

Legat, Riyadh's, crime problem priorities were properly documented, identified, and prioritized. A number of law enforcement and security entities in the Gulf Region identified terrorism as their most significant concern. The immediate goal of many of the terrorist groups, to include supporters of Usama Bin Laden, was to drive the U.S. out of the Gulf region. Most of the terrorist activities in the Middle East were targeted against the U.S. and its citizens. Despite this concern, each host government expressed a willingness to cooperate with Legat, Riyadh. A

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The Legat, Riyadh, addressed several international parental kidnaping matters, although the Saudi Government will ignore U.S. law and recognize the rights of the Arabic parent. As an example, during June 1997, a Saudi national took his daughter with him on a business trip to Saudi Arabia, and later refused to return the child to her U.S. mother, who had custody rights. The father was indicted in the U.S. and while efforts were underway by the Legat to assist the mother, the child was extracted from Saudi Arabia. The mother refused to furnish any details regarding the extraction. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the embassy for orchestrating the extraction. Legat, Riyadh, petitioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had requested assistance from the Mabahith as well as the Counsel Section of the embassy.

Legat, Riyadh, provided assistance in other matters, including an Oklahoma City Division ITSMV investigation. In 1997, the division conducted an investigation targeting an individual who acquired vehicles in the U.S., but failed to pay off the loans and later reported the vehicles as stolen. The investigation revealed that the vehicles were shipped to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The investigation was coordinated with the Mabahith in an effort to locate and interview persons to whom the vehicles were shipped.

An analysis of Legat, Riyadh's, investigations determined that 2,589 cases/leads were opened and assigned, of which 204 (7.8%) were NFIP, 189 (7.3%) were WCCP, seven (0.3%) were parental kidnaping leads, 1,692 (65.4%) were administrative leads, 122 (4.7%) were DOMTERR leads, and 375 (14.5%) were other miscellaneous leads. A random sampling of 500 leads were reviewed, of which 281 (56.2%) were handled on or before the established deadline. There were 119 (23.8%) leads which extended beyond the established deadline. There were 38 (7.6%) leads which were covered within 30 days of the deadline, and 62 (12.4%) leads which were covered within 60 days beyond the deadline. At the time of the inspection, 268 leads were pending, of which 79 (29.4%) were beyond the established deadline. The inspection determined that the delinquency rate was due to administrative delays and a failure to close/cover the leads from the ACS. The Legat advised that the ACS was often not accessible due to technical problems. During the interview of the Legat, it was determined that many delays were due to the time associated with translating the related documents into the applicable language, Arabic and English. Some delays were the result of leads occurring in countries in which the Legat was not accredited, and therefore, he was obliged to refer those leads through the various RSOs. The Inspector recommended that Legat, Riyadh, seek accreditation in each country within his territory to facilitate the expeditious handling of leads. The Legat did not maintain an unaddressed work file.

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The inspection determined that Legat, Riyadh's, role was essential in the resolution of important investigations impacting the Gulf Region, and in addressing terrorism activity directed against U.S. interest throughout the world. The investigative initiative demonstrated by the Legat personnel significantly enhanced the FBI's capability to obtain investigative assistance from law enforcement and intelligence agencies throughout the region, and contributed substantially to the resolution of criminal investigations impacting both the Gulf Region and the U.S.

TRAINING

Legat, Riyadh, successfully promoted the international law enforcement training program, which strengthened relations with the host law enforcement services. Legat, Riyadh, was instrumental in providing a variety of training to regional law enforcement. The training provided to the local services sensitized them to U.S. Government legal requirements for the prosecution of international terrorists and enhanced the FBI's working relationship with the local law enforcement services.

A variety of training was provided and presented during the inspection period. Legat, Riyadh, was the first U.S. law enforcement entity to be invited to present training at the NAASS, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The NAASS was equivalent to the NA and conducted training for twenty-two Middle Eastern countries. The Legat made presentations or coordinated training to officials from the countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman which related to the topics of Money Laundering, Financial Institution Fraud, interview and interrogation techniques, crime scene investigations, postblast analysis and Video Images Graphics Information Transceiver (VIGIT) technology. Legat, Riyadh, also personally provided a presentation to the Kuwait State Security (KSS) regarding the World Trade Center bombing. FBIHQ sponsored two courses at the request of Legat, Riyadh, in Oman for the Omani Internal Security Service and the Royal Oman Police.

During the inspection period, Legat, Riyadh, sponsored six representatives to the NA, two each from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The Legat also nominated three other NA candidates, two from Qatar and one from Oman. The Director of the KSS praised the Legat for his assistance in nominating KSS officials to the NA.

Training initiatives facilitated by Legat, Riyadh, enhanced the FBI's relationship with the law enforcement agencies, particularly in the crime problem areas that had a nexus in the U.S. Operational, security and safety training afforded the Legat staff was adequate. The ALAT has initiated Arabic language training, which will assist in his efforts in the region.

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