UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BASSEM YOUSSEF,

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:03CV01551(CKK)

Wilmington, Delaware

Friday,

March 18, 2005

DEPOSITION OF:

LOUIS J. FREEH

called for examination by counsel for the plaintiff, pursuant to notice of deposition, in the Executive Offices of MBNA America Bank, 1100 North King Street, Wilmington, Delaware, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

APPEARANCES

On Behalf of the Plaintiff:

STEPHEN M. KOHN, ESQ.
of: Kohn, Kohn, and Colapinto
3233 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 342-6980

On Behalf of the Defendants:

CARLOTTA WELLS, ESQ.
Senior Counsel
Federal Programs Branch
of: U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Room 7150
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-4522
(202) 307-0449
carlotta.wells@usdoj.gov

ALSO PRESENT:

KATHLEEN O=NEILL-TAYLOR, ESQ.
Assistant General Counsel
Office of the General Counsel
of: Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535
(202) 324-4524

MATTHEW SORENSEN, ESQ.
of: Kohn, Kohn, and Colapinto
3233 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

BASSEM YOUSSEF, Plaintiff

I-N-D-E-X

WITNESS	S:		DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
Louis	J.	Freeh	6	68	71	

EXHIB	<u>ITS</u>	IDENTIFIED
1	Photo of four people	12
2	Career board file	20
3	Division Head Comments, dated 5/29/0)3 26
4	Teletype, Freeh to State, dated 1/17	7/97 30
5	Memo, Criminal Investigative IRS to dated 11/03/98	Riyadh,
6	Excerpts before Senate Select Commit Intelligence Freeh testimony on 10/8	
7	Special Agent Mid-Level Mgmt. Selection Board	58
8	Inspection Report re Legat, Riyadh	59

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

10:14 a.m.

Whereupon,

LOUIS J. FREEH

a witness, was called by Counsel for the plaintiff, and having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KOHN:

- Q Judge Freeh, would you please state your name and address for the record?
- A Yes. Louis Joseph Freeh, F-R-E-E-H, 1100
 North King Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19807.
 - Q And you reside in Wilmington, Delaware?
 - A Yes.

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- Q This is a deposition in the case of Mr. Bassem Youssef. And my name is Steve Kohn, attorney for Youssef.
 - A Yes.
 - Q And you're an licensed attorney?
- $\mathsf{A} \qquad \mathsf{Yes.}$
 - Q And have you ever taken depositions?

1	A And you're generally familiar with the
2	rules that govern them?
3	A I am.
4	Q And are you represented here by counsel?
5	A No. Well, I should say I am. I'm here
6	with the Department of Justice attorneys who I've
7	discussed the case with very briefly. And they are
8	appearing on behalf on the Department of Justice in
9	connection with my deposition.
10	Q And what's your current job?
11	A I'm the general counsel from MBNA Bank,
12	which is a Delaware corporation, a national bank.
13	Q And prior to that where did you work?
14	A I was Director of the FBI from 1993 to
15	2001.
16	Q And before being the Director of the FBI,
17	what position did you hold?
18	A I was a judge, a District Court Judge in
19	New York City, 1991 to 1993. And prior to that I was an
20	Assistant U.S. Attorney in New York Attorney's
21	Office, Southern District New York, 1981 to 1991. And
22	prior to that I was an FBI agent from 1975 to 1981.

you

Q And as the Director of th	e FBI, did you
have any involvement in what's know	as the Legat
Program.	
A Legat Program. Yes, sir.	
Q And just briefly, what was y	your involvement
with the Legat Program?	
A Well, you know as Direct	or one of my
responsibilities was to appoint FBI Le	egats, and that
was a selection process that would	take place at
headquarters. The FBI Director would ul	timately select
the Legats as well as what we would cal	.l the assistant
Legats for the program.	
The other involvement I had	over the years
as Director was establishing and opening	ng up new Legat
offices. And that was a long process	that required
discussions with the Department of St	ate, the White
House, other federal agencies, the cou	ntries where we
were intending to place Legats. And in	that period of
time we opened a number of Legats, so t	hat was part of
the responsibility of the Director.	

And did you view the Legat program as an

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important program for the Bureau?

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1	A Yes.
2	Q Why?
3	A Well, in a world where our responsibilities
4	are not only transnational but international and the
5	development of, you know, what we call globalized crime
6	whether it was organized crime drug trafficking,
7	terrorism, financial crimes, you know moving from a
8	U.S. platform to an international platform required the
9	FBI in my view, and the view of many others, to have
10	liaison in many more countries than we had had
11	previously.
12	Q Now you said that you personally would make
13	the decision to appoint a Legat to a particular office?
14	A Yes.
15	Q What were the types of qualifications you
16	were looking for for persons who would take that
17	position?
18	A Well, I mean there would be a number of
19	different factors. The main factor would be the
20	ability of that candidate to understand and perform the
21	functions on behalf of the FBI as the main liaison with
22	the host country, police authorities as well as the

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

security authorities. So you would want a very experienced agent, someone who had, you know, good investigative credentials.

You would want someone who had many of the qualities that we would want for foreign liaison, which means the ability to deal with a wide variety of different agencies in our own embassy as well as the foreign government. So you would want some good liaison skills, good personal skills.

You would want good judgment. You would want maturity.

The language would be very important, not essential, in many of the countries. Because we were opening up new countries, we didn't have qualified language speakers the Legats. So that would not be a requirement, it would certainly be a preference. Language, therefore, would be very important.

All those factors, you know, and suitability, reputation. Obviously, the reliability of someone who would be representing not just the FBI, but the United States in a very sensitive setting. All of those would be important factors.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	Q And were you also involved with the FBI's
2	counterterrorism program?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And how involved were you with that aspect
5	of the FBI?
6	A Well, I mean it was one of our major
7	programs, even beginning in 1993 when I became
8	Director. As, you know, the number and complexity of
9	cases developed over the years, the program grew. We
10	ultimately set up a separate counterterrorism division
11	in 1999. It was an integral part of our Legat program,
12	our foreign liaison program.
13	We grew it substantially over the period of
14	1993 to 2001, doubling the number of people involved,
15	tripling I think the budget at one point up to 2001. So
16	it became a very important and a very essential program
17	given the responsibilities, the increasing number of
18	terrorist acts. East African Embassy bombings, USS
19	COLE, obviously, Khobar. You know, they made this
20	program a very critical one and a very prominent one
21	back in headquarters.
22	Q And in terms of your personal involvement,

was the counterterrorism a program that you essentially delegated to others or were you directly involved with managerial aspects?

A No. I mean, we had a whole division at the point that I left of counterterrorism, including an Assistant Director. And then section managers all the way down to case squads around the United States. So I didn't -- I wouldn't say I directly managed the program. I oversaw it as I oversaw all the programs of the FBI, as well as the administrative functions.

- Q Do you know a Mr. Bassem Youssef?
- A Yes.

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Q And how did you first become aware of Mr. Youssef?

A I think in connection with the establishment of the Legat in Riyadh, as best I can recall. Certainly met him and came to know him after he was appointed as Legat. And I couldn't recall the exact circumstances under which we met, but I think it was probably in connection with the establishment of the office. A lot of the previous work leading up to the office because of his -- his knowledge of the language,

1	his experience as an agent. I would connect it with
2	that, but you know there may be other circumstances
3	under which we specifically met, but I don't recall.
4	Q I just want to call your attention to in or
5	about 1994. Do you remember at all attending what
6	is the DCI Award?
7	A The Director of Counter Intelligence
8	Award?
9	Q Yes.
10	A Yes. It's an award, I think, that the
11	Bureau sponsors.
12	Q And do you know what the selection process
13	or how people are chosen for that?
14	A Not specifically, no.
15	Q Within the intelligence communities is that
16	considered prestigious?
17	A Yes. It's a recognized award.
18	Q Do you remember at all in, I believe, 1994
19	attending the DCI Award ceremony in which the award was
20	given to Mr. Youssef?
21	A I don't specifically recall that, no.
22	Q Okay. I think he said it would the
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1	Director of Central Intelligence.
2	A Okay. So that was a CIA award?
3	(Whereupon, the document was
4	marked as Exhibit 1 for
5	identification.)
6	MR. KOHN: I'm going to have marked as
7	Exhibit 1 a Xerox of a photograph of Mr. Youssef and
8	Judge Freeh and with members of Mr. Youssef's family.
9	And I'll just state for the record this is
10	a photograph of when Mr. Youssef got the DCI Award and
11	you were present. And it was a photograph taken.
12	BY MR. KOHN:
13	Q Does that refresh your recollection at all
14	as to this?
15	A Yes, I mean it does. I I certainly
16	remember meeting his family. I wouldn't initially have
17	put it at this ceremony, but I do remember meeting his
18	family, yes. Obviously, the picture reflects my meeting
19	there.
20	Q And do you have any recollection what he
21	was given that award for?
22	A I'm sorry, I don't.

Q You mentioned that you first remember him through him as a Legat. What do you remember about that; how his name came to your attention and the process for that?

Well, I mean, he was in the Legat package Α that was presented to me. We have a selection board. And Bassem's name together with some additional candidates were put in that package after a selection and review process that would be designed to give to the Director three or four qualified candidates for Legat. And I selected him at that particular time. It was the first agent that we were sending to Saudi Arabia, as I recall.

Q This Saudi Arabia post, why was that created?

A Well, it was created as a integral part of our counterterrorism program and strategy. When I became the Director, we were talking about counterterrorism it -- it surprised, I guess, that we didn't have offices in Cairo and Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Islamabad, places like that. So one of the things that I did early on was the sort of process where we would

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establish those embassies.

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My view was, you know, we couldn't cover those kinds of programs with countries on the level with Saudi Arabia out of Rome, which is I think what we did at the time. It was just, you know, the agents would get there once or twice a year, if that, and they had no personal relationships with the in-country services. So not just because of the OPM-SANG bombing and the Khobar case, it was clear that we needed physical presence of liaison agents in those countries.

Q And as I understand it Mr. Youssef would have to open up an office, establish a new office there?

A Yes.

Q And if you know, in terms of difficulty do you think it would be harder for an agent to come into a nation and establish a new office or if there was one already present to come in and take over a continuing operating office?

A Yes. Well, I guess it would depend on the country. I mean, there were some countries we opened offices up where, I mean, the host countries were so

thrilled and excited about getting us there, like in Warsaw, that you know it was a very easy, almost mechanical process.

Saudi Arabia was a much more challenging process. So I would probably describe that as a much more difficult understanding then, you know, either filling a ongoing Legat office or putting one in a country where, you know, all the circumstances made it just a much more hospitable event.

Q And if you can briefly describe some of the circumstances that would make Saudi Arabia a more challenging office to open for the FBI at that time?

A Yes. Well --

MS. WELLS: Object to form.

I think the -- you know, the THE WITNESS: main -- the main challenge there was we had never -- we had never had a relationship with the Mabahith, the equivalent of federal police, the security service there which performs the function of the federal I mean, there was no liaison to speak of. through had some connections Rome. We had connections through the CIA and RSO and the Embassy,

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but there was no relationship there. So that as the hardest thing. This was a service that didn't know the FBI. We didn't really know them. There was no ongoing relationship, I don't think, any base point of trust to start from. So, I mean, it was -- it was a difficult undertaking.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q And in terms of the cultural issues, the differences, say, the way Saudi government viewed American law enforcement or certain activities with the American cultural issues, did that pose any particular problems?

A Yes. I mean, a lot of their -- you know, a lot of their equivalent criminal process we would call it, you know, is tied up in Shari'a, which is the religious law, religious courts as opposed to civilian courts.

You know, the notion that FBI agents could perform even assisted -- Saudi assisted interviews or do any kind of operational activities in the country was something that was very strongly resisted for a long time. They didn't understand our process. They

didn't understand the fact that under all rules, for instance, of information that they gave us in many cases would have to be turned over to defendants in a criminal case in discovery.

So, I mean it is very -- you know foreign in the proper sense of the word; processes and procedures and expectations and understandings of each other's process. So that's -- that's what the liaison, you know, difficult.

And prior to Mr. Youssef taking Ι would call position, were there what either misunderstandings or tensions between the Saudi Arabian government and the United States on issues such as access to suspects in various terrorist activities that related to the United States?

A Yes, before and after. I mean, there was a continuing series of difficulties in, you know, making requests that would be fulfilled by the Saudis in a manner that we could, you know, use the information or the evidence that they were providing. I mean, it was a constant back and forth and negotiation and discussion. And sometimes, you know, I would have to go very senior

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levels of the Saudi government to get particular requests addressed because they were either not understood or not accepted at lower levels -- senior levels but levels beyond -- below the top government officials.

Q And at the time of his appointment were there any particular issues outstanding related to the Khobar Towers terrorist attack?

A Yes. I mean, for a long time we were trying to get access to witnesses who had been detained by the Saudi government and who we thought had information relative to the attack. And we wanted that FBI agent - I wanted FBI agents to be able to interview them directly and do that with the understanding that not only would the information be used, but there may come a point where we'd actually need to take the deposition testimony or provide these individuals as witnesses in an American proceeding. And that was a very difficult concept for the Saudis to understand: (1) because it was a request being made as they were in the middle of their process, which was a religious court process and they were very concerned about FBI contacts tainting

their process or interfering with their process and didn't understand why we couldn't just interview them, take the information, bring it back to our court. We were explaining to them that, you know, we had to have direct access and that ultimately they might have to in court or we might have to take their appear deposition with defense counsel and defendants present electronically or whatever. And those were very difficult concepts for them to understand. Q Now, at the time you were in your mind

Q Now, at the time you were in your mind selecting who would be the first Legat in Saudi Arabian representing the FBI, I mean was that a given, the law enforcement needs of the United States? Was that an important appointment?

A Yes.

Q And was that one that you wanted to be very careful that the person was the right person for that job?

A Yes.

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Q Now, at the beginning when I asked you questions about the general qualifications for Legat, and you mentioned liaison, you mentioned good working relations, a number of things, why would experience in international terrorism be important? Why not just put someone who has had a really strong recognized liaison background and let him learn international terrorism while in Saudi Arabia?

Well, I'm not saying you couldn't do that. I mean, if we had an -- you know, an outstanding investigator criminal who had no particular counterterrorism experience and no other candidate, you know, I would not preclude that candidate from going there. Because part of the Legat's primary responsibility is really facilitating investigations, making sure that the host country police are being tasked to provide the right information. And you need the experience of a good criminal investigator to know what's relevant, you know what documentary and physical evidence has to be selected, how that information was obtain whether it's tainted or could be suppressed in So, I mean, I wouldn't exclude an American court.

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someone with criminal and non-counterterrorism background. But if you have a candidate that has the counterterrorism background in addition to everything else, it would certainly be all other things being equal, a preferable candidate.

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16	MR. KOHN: Okay. I'm going to show th	ıe
17	witness a document we'll mark as Exhibit 3.	
18	(Whereupon, the document wa	ıs
19	marked as Exhibit 3 fo	r
20	identification)	
21	MR. KOHN: And for the record, Exhibit	3
22	are division head comments to Mr. Youssef's prior	

liaison in Cairo, Egypt. And for the record, it's a one page document in the top left hand corner it says - it looks like the number 11 with some handwritten notations, division head comments. And the first line says "Based on SA Youssef's Egyptian heritage," and it goes on.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q If you would please look at that and see if that refreshes your recollection of anything you may have heard or known about his prior work in Cairo.

A Yes. You know, I -- again, sitting here today I can't say that it does. But, you know, what I would have done in addition to reading the document you've marked as Exhibit 2, you know I would have had conversations. It would have been my normal practice to talk to, for instance, Alan Ringgold who is on the copy count. I would have surely spoken to Randy Perleman. And, you know, I would have asked about both candidates, and in that conversation I may have been told about his liaison work in Egypt. I don't remember getting a letter from the Ambassador. But -- you know, I got so many fine letters about agents and I just

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couldn't -- I couldn't recall.

Q And -

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		MR. K	: NHC	And	I'm 🤄	going	g to	show	the
witness	a	document	that	we've	marked	as	Exhibi	t 4.	

(Whereupon, the document was marked as Exhibit 4 for identification.)

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COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 MR. KOHN: And for the record Exhibit 4 is a document on the first page, it appears to be a teletype. It's dated January 17. 1997 apparently from Director FBI to State Department. And it appears to be 12 pages long, I believe.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q Do you recognize this document?

A No. I mean, I recognize it as a copy of an FBI communication, but I don't recognize it as a document.

Q And for the record, this appears to be a teletype announcing to the State Department and the Embassy in Riyadh that Mr. Youssef had been appointed to the Legat position.

And if you can turn to the second page, the top two paragraphs are kind of like a summary of his background. Do you know in looking at this it talks about the Desert War major case. Do you know what the Desert War case was?

A No. No. I'm thinking it's, you know, the first Iraqi war, but I'm not familiar with it.

Q And would this have been something that was

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sent out in your name? If you look on page 3, it has your name to it? Yes. I mean, everyday the FBI -- and I'm Α trying to correct this without any success -- thousands of documents would go out under my name and come to me, and I saw probably none of them in original form. This is just a format that they would use. Q Okay. This would have been probably sent out by 10 Ringgold or someone in the Foreign Liaison. I would not -- in other words, it would not be necessary for me to 11 review or sign off on . 12 Now after his appointment, do you remember 13 calling Mr. Youssef and telling him he got the job? 14 did. 15 Α sure Ι That normal I'm was my practice. I don't recall that conversation, 16 almost certainly would have done it and I don't think I 17 ever failed to do that. 18 19 And at the time of that appointment was there a sense of urgency to get Mr. Youssef from the 20 United States into Riyadh? 21 22 Α Yes.

0	And	why:
\sim	7 311 0	*****

A Well, again, you know once the State Department and the Saudi government had approved the establishment of the office, we would want to have somebody on the ground as quickly as possible just to evidence our commitment and strong interest in it. But also we had some very major investigations now going on, so it was essentially that we have somebody on the ground who would coordinate the investigation. Not conduct it, but be a liaison for it.

Q And was one of those major investigations ongoing the Khobar Towers bombing?

A Yes.

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Q Did you have any involvement in that investigation?

Α like many of the Yes. Ι mean, major investigations it was something that I was initially very involved in. Continuously over the years, you know, I made a number of trips to Saudi Arabia and met worked closely with senior officials, Ambassador here. And then throughout the Government because of the nature of the crime and the

enormity of the attack, you know, it was a case I maintained a great deal of interest in until I left the FBI.

Q And were you aware that in Saudi Arabia Mr. Youssef was also working on that case?

A Yes.

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Q My first question is did you learn anything in headquarters that gave you an indication as to whether Mr. Youssef was successful in establishing liaison with the Saudi government.

MS. WELLS: Object to form.

THE WITNESS: You know, on a number of occasions the Saudi government officials with whom I dealt compliments Bassem on his liaison in a very positive way. I couldn't tell you exactly who it was. I don't think it was the Crown Prince, for instance. It was probably the Minister of the Interior, Prince Naif. In fact, I know that he complimented Bassem to me on, you know, at least one occasion, probably more than one occasion.

And then the officials in the Mabahith, the police service there, and again I can't remember the

names. But, yes, they would -- they would on occasion because I would ask them or they would volunteer compliment him on his liaison and his work there.

BY MR. KOHN:

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- Q And the Minister of Interior, in terms of your understanding of the way the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia operates on a day-to-day basis, how important were good relations with the Minister of Interior of that government be to the FBI for the FBI to do the mission that it was intended to do?
 - A Yes, that would be essential.
- Q And did the Minister of Interior have a control over the various police departments and law enforcement agencies?
 - A Yes, absolutely.
- Q And you've already testified, the Mabahith, were they part of the Ministry of Interior?

A Yes. They reported to the Minister and his officials. But, you know, in terms of law enforcement, national security, internal security, external security -- no, external security is not included in that portfolio. All the other matters would be directly

under the Minister of the Interior. And he would be -he was my principal liaison over there, even though I
think he was probably a more senior equivalent official
than the FBI Director. But he was my liaison, he was
the individual that I would most frequently interact.

Q Other than hearing it from Saudis, were you able to observe anything in terms of access, in terms of assistance in cases, things like that, that would give you an indication that objectively Mr. Youssef did establish good liaison in a way that was beneficial to the United States?

Well I know when I was in Saudi Arabia and he would accompany me to these meetings, sometimes he would translate. But Prince Naif generally, you know, had his own translator. would watch them interact. I could certainly observe a very good relationship, very cordial relationship, very respectful relationship from the point of view of the And, you know, my sense from that meeting Minister. but also meetings with the police officials that he was -- he was very well regarded there.

Q In terms of the Khobar Tower case, do you

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remember there was a time, as I understand it, that the Saudi officials were still not allowing some form of direct access or questioning and the FBI put together a series of written questions they wanted submitted to those prisoners to be answered. Do you remember that?

A Yes.

Q Do you remember whether Mr. Youssef had any role whatsoever in facilitating the interaction between the United States and the Saudi Arabian government to have those questions answered?

A Well, he was certainly involved in that.

And, you know, I know we had meetings in the Kingdom with various police officials. I think Prince Naif on one occasion. We would make that request and talk about the request and discuss it. So he was clearly involved in that.

While I was in Washington I would have many other meetings and Bassem was not in attendance because he was in Saudi Arabia where he needed to be. But, you know, I was meeting with the Saudi Ambassador. On other occasions I would meet with the Crown Prince, Prince Sultan, the Defense Minister, many of the other Saudi

officials who were in the United States. And, you know,
I was pressing that request. A number of other
requests later, but I was pressing initially the
request that, you know, we be at least allowed to
furnish them questions.
So, you know, I mean there were a lot of
people working on that request at the same time.
Q And do you remember the circumstances of
actually getting the answers to the questions?
A Yes.
Q What do you remember about that?
A Well, I mean there came a time when we got
from the Saudi Government I think delivered two Bassem
directly and then back to the case agents in
Washington, you know, the answers or summaries of the
questions that we were asked to be put to them. And we
were very excited about that. That was a very
important development of the case.
Q So to the best of your recollection, the
Saudi officials gave it to Mr. Youssef and then he
forwarded it for the FBI?

Yes, which would have been the normal

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course through any Legat.

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Q And do you remember any conversations with Mr. Youssef about that?

You know, I'm sure we had conversations. anything specifically except remember remember we were quite excited, even though it was a very, very far distance between that and, you know, could ever get in terms of evidentiary what materials. So we continued to press for direct FBI interviews, which at one point we were allowed to perform but with the presence of Saudi officials. then we continued to press for FBI officials without the Saudi officials. That took an awfully long time. And that really wasn't accomplished until 2000. So there was a continuing difficulty, as I alluded to before, in getting the Saudis even at the highest level to agree to giving us access in a manner that we could then use for evidence. Because we were not looking to brief these guys for intelligence. We were looking to develop witnesses that could be used in a prosecution in the United States.

Q And do you remember what Mr. Youssef's role

was in trying to facilitate those interviews?

mean, he had an integral Ι would be the direct liaison with the because he Mabahith and, you know, my request to the Saudis were always forwarded to him. And the information and then the response back from the Saudis were -- was responded to. But, you know, that wasn't -- we were working at other levels. In fact, very high level and I was in White House, you know, asking literally the President and the Vice President to make that specific request and others to the Crown Prince in meetings in Washington, meetings in New York. And as I said, I was meeting on some occasions with the U.S. Ambassador and other FBI officials with the Crown Prince in Washington making the request. So it was multiple channels which were going on at the same time.

Q There came a time I think where you visited Saudi Arabia and Mr. Youssef facilitated that or accompanied you?

A Sure. There was probably a couple of visits.

Q And how would you describe Mr. Youssef's

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performance during those visits? I mean, I would perform it as -- I would characterize it as -- as excellent. I mean, I was very pleased with his performance. I said before, I noted a very good relationship between him and the Saudi officials. Ι observed a good relationship between him and the Ambassador. So I was very pleased with what I saw. 8 I just want to go back to Los Angeles for a 0 10 moment before the Legat. The Legat. 11 The Legat. I'm sorry. 12 Do you remember Mr. Youssef being given FBI 13 credentials in a phony name? 14 15 Α No. And within the FBI is that something -- is 16 0 that very uncommon that an agent would be given -- do 17 you know why an agent would be given official FBI 18 19 credentials in a phony name? 20 Sure. It would be for security And we did that with Joe Pistone who would be 21 reasons. undercovering organized 22 crime case. We did it

1	occasionally for individuals. Joe Pistone I remember
2	specifically because I had him as a witness in a case
3	when I was a prosecutor. So we would do that from time-
4	to-time for security reasons.
5	Q Do you know
6	A Not undercover reasons, but security
7	reasons.
8	Q In the area of counterterrorism, do you
9	know if that was something that had been done on a
10	common basis or uncommon, do you know?
11	A I would say it would be uncommon. It would
12	not I would not have thought of it as a common
13	process. I think it would be an unusual event.
14	Q In terms of Mr. Youssef's overall
15	performance at Legat Riyadh, how would you describe
16	I know you've given testimony on this before, but if
17	you were like the rating official, and I know you
18	weren't, but how would you overall describe his
19	liaison?
20	MS. WELLS: Object to the form. Asked and
21	answered.
22	THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, I would give

him a very, very high performance based on, again, what I saw and what observed, what I heard, what I knew at the time. BY MR. KOHN: And what about interpersonal skills? Α I mean, again, you Same -- same answer. know I was with him at meetings. I talked to lots of Saudi officials when he was present, when he wasn't 8 present and, you know, on several occasions I mean he 10 was complimented by those officials directly to me. And what about leadership? Yes. I mean, someone goes into a country, 12 sets up a Legat office under those types of challenging 13 circumstances, I'd give him very high -- again, the 14 same high regard and evaluation on that. 15 And just for the record, was the Khobar 16 0 Towers bombing case considered a major case of the FBI 17 at the time? 18 19 Α Yes. 20 Q Object to form. BY MR. KOHN: And I don't know if there's a formal rating 22 Q

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system, but I understand that the FBI would jurisdiction over hundreds of different types of crimes and different levels. Was there a system to rate priorities like, in other words, how you would view Khobar Towers versus, say, a bank robbery in Tulsa, Oklahoma? Not to say that wasn't a terrible thing, I'm just wondering for resources --

Α Yes. I don't think we had -- we didn't have -- we didn't have a specific rating system. But, I mean, it was one of the top dozen cases during the time that I was there. And that wasn't because I wasn't interested in it. It was because of, you know, a crime and a terrorist act of that nature which, you know, as the investigation developed reflected not just individual participation but state participation. it became immensely important mean very investigation, not just to the Bureau, but to the United States.

Q And just overall in terms of what Mr. Youssef did for the Khobar Towers investigation, how would you rate his performance on that?

A Very good.

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Q I want to call your attention, to you remember at some point there was a meeting in I believe in your office in headquarters with Prince Bander, the Ambassador, Prince Mohamed bin Naif, the Assistant Minister of Interior, I believe Dale Watson was there? I believe Mr. Youssef was there.

A Yes.

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And do you remember during that meeting you asking one of the representatives from Saudi Arabia about how they would like to continue the liaison between the two, between Saudi Arabia and the United States?

A Yes, not specifically. We had a couple of -- first of all, I had a lot of meetings with -- with Prince Bandar in my office. I think when Prince Mohamed came, that was a -- I mean that was a very -- I think he visited twice when I was at the FBI. And he had a -- I think he was one of the -- I think he was the Deputy Minister of the Interior, that was his title. But he was also the son of the Minister.

So we put together, you know, a day of briefings and meetings. And I remember that

1	specifically. I don't remember that specific question
2	being asked.
3	Q Do you remember Prince Mohamed the
4	account that I have here indicates that there came a
5	point where Prince Mohamed stopped speaking in Arabic
6	and then broke into English and relayed a message from
7	the Minister of Interior, words to the effect we want
8	you to know we think Bassem is a good guy and that we'd
9	like to continue liaison with him. Does that refresh
10	your recollection at all?
11	A No. No, it doesn't.
12	Q But in overall, was it your impression that
13	the Saudis, that Mr. Youssef was very important
14	played an important role in facilitating liaison
15	between Saudi Arabia and the United States?
16	A Yes. I mean, not just my impression. I
17	mean, they told me that, so
18	Q Okay. Now was Riyadh considered a hardship
19	post?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Why?
22	A Well, for a number of reasons. One just

physical security for FBI personnel, their families, you know that would be different from a lot of other postings other overseas. Maybe not today or post-September 11th, but certainly when we opened up the office.

Also, I mean, the restrictions on just social activities. Your spouse, if your spouse happens to be the wife. You know, the schools, the culture, the religious law which even foreigners have to subscribe to.

You know, we used to have issues about sending female agents over there. In fact, the case agent in Khobar was a woman, an excellent agent. And, you know, we had to talk about at senior levels, you know, how she would interact, what she would wear when she visited the Kingdom, etcetera. I mean, it's a very difficult post for anybody to be in.

- Q And as I understand it, the assignment would be a two year assignment?
 - A Generally a two year assignment.
- Q And were you involved at all in the decision to extend Mr. Youssef from a two year to a

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1	second two year post then?
2	A Yes, I would have definitely been involved
3	in that, at least having to approve it.
4	Q And as I understand it, when that approval
5	process would happen, there would be like a poll taken
6	of the various persons he would interact with and to
7	see if they would object, or does that refresh your
8	recollection?
9	MS. WELLS: Object to the form.
10	THE WITNESS: No.
11	BY MR. KOHN:
12	Q And I'm going to show the witness, which
13	would be Exhibit 6. I'm going to change the marking on
14	this from 6 to 5 in my hand.
15	(Whereupon, the document was
16	marked as Exhibit 5 for
17	identification.)
18	MR. KOHN: So Exhibit 5 is a two page
19	document. It's dated 11/03/98 to Riyadh, attention
20	Bassem Youssef. And it says drafted by Austin,
21	Patricia.
22	THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. KOHN:

this the second full you see on paragraph, it references I believe canvassing various sections to determine if there are any reservations regarding granting the extension.

A Yes.

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Q Do you see that CID and NSD responses were very complimentary?

A Yes.

Q Does that refresh your recollection as to whether there was a process before granting an extension that there would be a canvass of major principals to see if there were any concerns about that?

Yes. I can't say that I remember that as a Α process, but certainly what I would expect to happen is if an extension was going to be given, you know, certainly within the headquarters units there would have be some due diligence done to as to the performance of that person before we'd make a decision to extend them.

I would have probably been involved in one

1	of those discussions. Probably I don't remember one,
2	but Ringgold being gone now, it would have been with
3	Mike DiPretoro. They would not I mean, they would
4	not extend a Legat would not be extended for this
5	period of time without my approval.
6	Q And just for the record, CID stands for?
7	A Criminal Investigative Division.
8	Q And NSD?
9	A National Security Division. This was prior
10	to having the Counterterrorism Division.
11	Q And would those be very important divisions
12	that Mr. Youssef would have to have effective, say,
13	liaison or interactions with?
14	A Yes, the two most important at the time.
15	MR. KOHN: And now I think I'll be showing
16	the witness Exhibit 6, which are excerpts from a
17	hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence,
18	U.S. Senate. And this from the official print of the
19	Committee.
20	(Whereupon, the document was
21	marked as Exhibit 6 for
22	identification.)

THE WITNESS: 2002. BY MR. KOHN: It's joint inquiry Q 2002. the into intelligence activities before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. And I believe the testimony here of -- and I have excerpted some of the testimony of Judge Freeh from that hearing. 8 And the page numbers I'm going to refer to when I use this exhibit are the page numbers from the 9 10 Committee print, which are on the very top. page numbers on the bottom. 11 for the record, do 12 you testifying for this Committee on or about October 8, 13 2002. 14 Yes. 15 Α 0 And --16 17 Α Page 465. First I'd like to call your attention --18 Q 19 yes, and the testimony here, this is your testimony beginning on page 449. 20 21 Α Yes. And if you'd just go to page 463, which is 22 Q **NEAL R. GROSS**

part of your testimony you reference in talking about the Legat program, and I'm looking at the very top paragraph, full paragraph, you say "Riyadh and other critical locations around the world." You mentioned Tel Aviv, Ankara, a number.

A Yes.

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Q Why was Riyadh a critical location around the world?

Yes, well as I said before, you know in terms of the counterterrorism program when I took over as Director, you know, and I understood where we had offices, I couldn't understand why we didn't offices in the countries that are recited on page 463. Cairo, Islamabad, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Riyadh in the that for counterterrorism purposes, sense enforcement as well as intelligence, those were the central countries of, you know, U.S. concern, focus and vulnerability. So it didn't make any sense that we could run that program without having agents on the ground in those places.

Q And the --

A And -- excuse me. And many other places.

1	These are the ones that I happened to recite because we	
2	opened offices there.	
3	Q And the last sentence, you state "Critical	
4	alliances and partnerships with law enforcement	
5	security services in those countries has paid enormous	
6	benefits and has protected this nation and our people	
7	from acts of terrorism."	
8	A Yes.	
9	Q So that sentence, that would relate back in	
10	part to Riyadh?	
11	A Yes.	
12	Q And would it be your testimony that the	
12	Q And would it be your testimony that the work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those	
13	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those	
13	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those positive results identified here?	
13 14 15	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those positive results identified here? A Yes, certainly contributed to them.	
13 14 15 16	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those positive results identified here? A Yes, certainly contributed to them. Q And if you could please turn to page	
13 14 15 16	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those positive results identified here? A Yes, certainly contributed to them. Q And if you could please turn to page we're looking at page 464/465. And this was your	
13 14 15 16 17	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those positive results identified here? A Yes, certainly contributed to them. Q And if you could please turn to page we're looking at page 464/465. And this was your testimony related to the Khobar Towers?	
13 14 15 16 17 18	work of Mr. Youssef in Riyadh contributed to those positive results identified here? A Yes, certainly contributed to them. Q And if you could please turn to page we're looking at page 464/465. And this was your testimony related to the Khobar Towers? A Yes.	

Arabia quickly made critical liaison relationships of trust were established between FBI and Mabahith." Is that agent Mr. Youssef?

A Yes.

Q And if you could please turn to page 596/97.

A Okay.

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Q And that is there's a question on 596 from Senator Shelby and he's talking about, if you look at the very bottom of 596/597, he's talking about apparently there had been prior testimony given to his Committee about problems and impediments between the Saudi government and the United States regarding the Khobar Towers. Do you see that?

A Bottom of 96?

Q Yes. The bottom of 596, the top of 597. Senator Shelby says "I recall and the record will reflect that in the Committee that you told us in Committee on several occasions dealing with Khobar Towers that the problem impediment early on -- maybe it improved." Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q So would it be true that prior to Mr. Youssef becoming the Legat there had been some problems with that interaction between the Saudis and the United States, and apparently that had been discussed before Mr. Shelby's Committee?

MS. WELLS: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Yes, but as I said, problems both before and after. I mean, no reflection on Bassem's good work here. I mean, the problems continued way beyond the period that he got there, the liaison problems. Not because of his representation, but because of the matters I described to you earlier in the deposition.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q And then in response to that question, if you see you mentioned that -- and I'm looking at there's a one paragraph answer. You're addressing him and you're saying that, if you see it, "slowly but in a very, very positive fashion ultimately resulting in the type of access that I testified to." You're talking about that there had been, it looks like from this testimony, an improvement in that relationship?

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A Yes. Yes. The relationship improved, as I said, up to, you know, May of 2001 which is when I left my direct involvement in Khobar. But there were -- there was an increasing continuum of improvement in that relationship from an FBI law enforcement point of view during that period.

Q And how would you describe Mr. Youssef's contribution while he was the Legat to that improved relationship?

MS. WELLS: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, and as I said before, I think he was the essential player. I think his -- his very good work there, the high regard that the Saudis had for him advanced that. But, you know, it was nothing that Bassem could have accomplished on his own in terms of what we ultimately needed there. And what we ultimately needed was FBI agents sitting one-on-one without Saudi police officials interviewing people who detained in their equivalent criminal process. And that was the objective that we had to get to, which we didn't get to until late 2000. And that required literally, you know, the involvement of the

President of the United States and the Crown Prince directly.

Q And did you have any involvement in the selection process for when Mr. Youssef came back to the United States? He was given a position in the NACIC?

A I don't know if that was a position that the Director signed off on or not. I just don't recall. There was a limited number of positions that, as you saw with the Legat position, the FBI Director personally signs off on. I'm not sure if that was one or not.

-- PGS 57 - 59 REMOVED, SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER --

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4	MR. KOHN: And I'm going to show the	
5	witness a document I have had marked as Exhibit 8.	
6	(Whereupon, the document was	
7	marked as Exhibit 8 for	
8	identification.)	
9	MR. KOHN: And for the record Exhibit 8 is	
10	from an inspection report of the Legat Riyadh office.	
11	Unfortunately, the Bates stamped numbers don't appear	
12	very well on it. The last page has the number 7644.	
13	And the first page is 7630, although it's cut off.	
14	THE WITNESS: Okay.	
15	BY MR. KOHN:	
16	Q Did you review inspection reports?	
17	A Some of them, not all of them.	
18	Q Did you review this particular inspection	
19	report out of Riyadh?	
20	A Yes, I don't recall that I did, Mr. Kohn.	
21	Let me look through it quickly, if I might.	
22	MS. WELLS: And I'd just like to note for	
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the record that this document is not complete. The table of contents notes that the findings and the appendix of findings would be on 17 and that that would run up to the abbreviations on page 25. And the exhibit that's been introduced stops at page 15.

MR. KOHN: And I agree. This is the first 15 pages of the report.

THE WITNESS: I don't -- looking at this,
I don't recall having reviewed this. On many occasions
I would review an inspection report. I generally would
put notes on the summary page if I had a particular
comment or inquiry or follow-up that I wanted done, or
if I wanted to have somebody commended or if I wanted
to write a note to the Ambassador or something. I don't
see anything on here that indicates I reviewed it, and
I don't recall reviewing it.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q If you could please look, and I'm looking at the page numbers that are in the report itself.

A Yes.

Q If you could please look at page 5. At the very bottom it references comments that apparently

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Ambassador Flower gave to the inspectors in which the Ambassador is quoted as saying he was "Just the right man" for the position. Did you have any discussions with Ambassador Fowler about Mr. Youssef?

A Yes, I did. And, you know, consistent with what's reflected on 7634, he was very complimentary of Bassem and his work there. And they, of course, when they were in a reporting position, the Chief of Mission is obviously the senior U.S. official in country. So although Bassem was a FBI agent, he also reported directly to the Ambassador. And he was very complimentary of him.

Q And if you could please look at page 14 of the report, which is 7643. And just put a number here.

"As an analysis of Legat Riyadh's investigations determined that there were 2589 case leads were open" and then it gives some statistics. I'm just wondering if you can answer it. Do you know in looking at the number of case leads and the type, how busy this office was?

MS. WELLS: Object to the form.

BY MR. KOHN:

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Q Can you make a determination on that in terms of the amount, the workload?

A Well, you know, maybe not on the basis of these numbers, because I'm just out of practice in terms of comparable Legat case loads and whatnot. But, I mean, I have a better source than what I would remember here, and that's just my experience with that office. It was a very, very busy office. And covering not just Saudi Arabia, but a number of -- you know, very complex and important neighboring countries. So, I mean it was -- I would have call it then, would call it now and based on my recollection an extremely busy office.

Q And what type of feedback did you -- what did you either observe or the type of feedback you received concerning Mr. Youssef's work in the neighboring countries other than Saudi Arabia?

anything Α You know, Ι don't recall specifically. I certainly don't recall anything negative at all. But I can't tell you. And I know --I visited a number of those countries. I think -- and I'm not sure if Bassem accompanied me or not. He

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1	certainly would have if he was the Legat at the time.
2	I really don't have a memory of that, but certainly
3	nothing except I don't remember anything negative or
4	anything that would have caused me any concern or alarm
5	about his performance. I think he was he spent most
6	of his time in the Saudi relationship, which was a full
7	time job.
8	Q Now, the 9/11 attack happened a number of
9	months after you left the Bureau, correct?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Were you aware that after that attack the
12	FBI what's known as TDY'ed a large number of agents and
13	personnel to assist in the investigation?
14	MS. WELLS: Object to form.
15	THE WITNESS: Yes. I knew that many
16	many FBI personnel was deployed overseas and yes.
17	BY MR. KOHN:
18	Q And if there was a major criminal action,
19	would it be typical for the FBI to TDY agents to work
20	on that case?
21	A Overseas?
22	Q Or domestically?

A Yes, certainly domestically that would be our practice. Overseas would really depend on the host country and, you know, the relationship there. I mean, if it happened in France, we wouldn't be sending a large number of FBI agents. It would depend on the country and the circumstances.

Q Based upon your knowledge of Mr. Youssef, his background experience, his performance, and this is hypothetical. But hypothetically if you were the Director at the time right after the 9/11 attack, would Mr. Youssef have been someone that you may have -- and assume he was back in headquarters or back in Washington not working counterterrorism. And for the record, he was at the NACIC. Would he be the type of person that you'd consider to TDY onto that type of activity?

MS. WELLS: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Yes. And I'm not good at hypothetical questions. Sure, I mean, based on all the matters we talked about this morning, the documents that you've showed me, I would certainly consider him. I mean, it would have to be in the context of, you

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know, where it was we needed him. You know, what his relative availability is -- I mean, who else was available. I mean, it would be a very hard question to answer.

I would certainly, you know, consider him as a person who we would deploy in that kind of a situation, yes. But, you know, it would have to depend on a lot of other factors.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q And in terms of his background and if it, experience, you can answer what types assignments do you think would have been practical to deploy him at?

MS. WELLS: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Again, domestically, internationally?

BY MR. KOHN:

Q Domestically.

A Domestically? Well, you know, I don't that we would -- that we would have deployed him from his current assignment domestically, you know, after 9/11 if he was in headquarters, I guess. I think, you know,

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given his experience, certainly his language, you know, domestically he would probably have a much required role and be of greater help back headquarters as opposed to going out to a field office. Internationally certainly given his language experience, his relationships with the Saudi officials, other countries he would be, you know, in my mind anyway a candidate that we would consider sending 8 into a TDY situation. 9 10 Based upon your knowledge of Mr. Youssef, did you know of any reason why that he shouldn't be 11 used in a TDY'd or a permanent role in -- well, first 12 13 of all, like in a TDY assignment for a terrorist attack such as the 9/11/01 attack? 14 MS. WELLS: Objection. 15 BY MR. KOHN: 16 17 Q Do you know of any reason why you may not want to use him. 18 19 MS. WELLS: Object to the form. 20 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, I think -- the decision to use him, rather it was formally appointing 21 22 him as a Legat or putting him, as I did with John

O'Neal, in charge of a particular investigation overseas, I mean I would have to -- I would have to know what the circumstances were at the time.

BY MR. KOHN:

Q Okay.

A I mean, I would factor in everything, certainly my own personal knowledge, my regard for him,

my high regard for my relationship. But I would want to factor in a lot of things. And, you know, would he be the right person in that particular situation? I don't know. I mean, what -- what is the situation? Is he dealing with Vice Fowler or is he dealing if some other

dealing with Vice Fowler or is he dealing if some other State Department official? It would depend on a lot of things.

Q Would there be any truth to the statement that you were unhappy with Mr. Youssef's performance in Saudi Arabia?

A No.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ KOHN: Let me just go off the record for a moment.

(Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m. off the record until 11:37 a.m.)

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MR. KOHN: No further questions.

MS. WELLS: We have a few.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MS. WELLS

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Q In your testimony that you provided earlier, just to provide a little more content.

Can you please describe your understanding of what the role that Legats overseas would play in investigations?

Yes. I mean, the Legat role is primarily a liaison role. they would not So be operational investigators in almost all circumstances. the agreements that we have with the host country is that they don't conduct the investigation. In most countries they're very sensitive about the Legats even, you know, picking up a phone and calling and somebody in country to get information. We have more leeway in some countries than others. But their main function is liaison, they would you to so know have the relationship with the host country these services and then agents coming into the country or DOJ attorneys coming into the country, or requests for information,

they would sort of be the traffic cop to ensure that the information flowed in the right direction and that the investigators when they were allowed to operate in the country, to do so.

MS. WELLS: Off the record.

(Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m. off the record until 11:45 a.m.)

BY MS. WELLS

Q Okay. I believe before we went off the record you were talking about you had answered a question about what in general what a role of the Legat would be in an overseas investigation.

A Yes. And it would be characterized, you know, as a liaison role. For instance, the FBI has an investigation to conduct which relates to witnesses or evidence in a country. They would be the officer in the embassy contacting the police services, making all the arrangements, requests for records, requests for interviews be taken place wither by local police officials or FBI agents who would visit.

On the other end if the host country has requests for information in connection with one of

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their matters, they want to speak to witnesses in the United States, there are bank records, they want funnel those requests through the liaison. So the liaison is -- traffic cop is the wrong word for it, but it's really a liaison and coordinating function, not an investigative function.

Q And is what you just described consistent with your understanding of Bassem Youssef's role was in the Khobar Towers investigation?

A Yes.

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Q And can you please state for the record who in your mind was the lead investigator for that investigation of Khobar Towers?

A Well, it would be Issac Jenkins. There was a number of Washington-based agents who -- I mean, I would consider them -- did consider them the case agents. They were the people who were responsible for the case, the case was assigned to them and they were preparing what we needed to get to an indictment.

Q Okay. Now to switch gears a little bit.

There has been some allegations in this case and there have been some questions in other depositions about

whether or not you are aware of any contacts by the Saudi Arabian government post-9/11/2001 to use Mr. Youssef as a liaison between them and the United States Government. Does that ring a bell with you? Is that anything that you're familiar with?

A No.

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MS. WELLS: I have no further questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KOHN:

Q Just a brief follow-up, which is in the context of Saudi Arabia at the time period that Mr. Youssef served as the Legat how important was it to the interests of the United States that his liaison work?

A Yes. Well, it was essential. I mean, if that liaison didn't work, the substitute for it would be in-country the CIA and the State Department, usually the regional security officer or back here, you know, myself and other officials in the executive dealing with Saudi officials, Ambassadors at very senior levels. So, I mean, that -- that had to work.

Q Okay.

MR. KOHN: Nothing further.

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deposition was concluded, signature having not been waived.)

(Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m. the taking of the