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BY FEDERAL EXPRESS

November 2, 2001

Special Agent Robert G. Wright, Jr.
610 W. Joliet St.
Crown Point, IN 46307

Dear Bob:

I have emailed to you today and also enclose herein copies of the "Complaint To The Federal Bureau Of Investigation Office Of Professional Responsibility And The United States Department Of Justice Office Of Inspector General For Dereliction Of Duty By The Federal Bureau Of Investigation In Failing To Investigate And Prosecute Terrorism And Obstruction Of Justice In Retaliating Against Special Agent Robert Wright" and your accompanying Attestation.

Please sign this letter on the line provided below to signify your authorization to Judicial Watch, Inc. to file this Complaint as your counsel with the FBI-OPR and the DOJ-OIG.

If you have any questions, please call me at (202) 646-5168.

Sincerely,

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

Michael J. Hurley

Cc: Larry Klayman, Esq.

Authorization:

Robert G. Wright, Jr.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Public and Congressional Affairs
Prepublication Review Section
Washington, D. C.

11/13/01

Sir,


The Bureau's prepublication review policy for current employees requires I submit the enclosed 40+ page document titled "IN THE MATTER of FBI Special Agent Robert G. Wright, Jr.," to OPCA for prepublication review prior to dissemination by myself and/or my attorneys to members of the U.S. Congress and other interested members of the public.

My attorneys, Larry Klayman, Judicial Watch, 501 School Street, S.W., Suite 725, Washington, D.C. 20024 and David Schippers, Shippers and Bailey, 20 North Clark St., Chicago, IL 60602 are currently seeking to schedule December meetings with U.S. Congressmen and U.S. Senators to discuss the contents of this document.

The document was not prepared on Bureau time and was not part of a previously approved FBI project. Documents utilized were obtained through domestic and international news agencies, court records and FOIPA. The document contains 47 endnotes which clearly identify the source documents. The source documents utilized in connection with the preparation of the manuscript, approximately 130 pages, are furnished in the pages following the document and are numbered in the center of the right hand side of each page.

I intend to identify myself as a Special Agent within the rules established by the Bureau. I am not presently assigned nor have I been assigned to terrorism matters during the past two years. The document is non-fiction.

I have not made any oral or written disclosures of drafts, initial manuscripts and so forth to any publishers, co-authors, ghost writers and/or unauthorized individuals. I have not contacted any publishers regarding my document.


Robert G. Wright, Jr.
610 West Joliet Street
Crown Point, IN 46307

IN THE MATTER of)
FBI Special Agent)
Robert G. Wright, Jr.)
_____)

COMPLAINT TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR DERELICTION OF DUTY BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
IN FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE TERRORISM AND
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IN RETALIATING AGAINST
SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT G. WRIGHT, JR.

Robert G. Wright, Jr., a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("SA Wright")¹, hereby submits this Complaint through his counsel, Judicial Watch, Inc. and Schippers & Bailey, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Office of Professional Responsibility (the "OPW") pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 29c (d) and to the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") Office of Inspector General (the "OIG") pursuant to the July 11, 2001 Order, signed by Attorney General John Ashcroft, that gives the OIG the same authority to investigate misconduct allegations against employees of the FBI as it has with respect to all other components of the DOJ¹.

Specifically, Special Agent Wright was assigned to the counterterrorism task force in

¹This Complaint is separate from the OPR action initiated against SA Wright in regard to the sexual harassment charge made by SA Cybil Reed in Case No. 66F-HQ- 1 26109 1.

Chicago² and was conducting a criminal investigation of the sources and methods of funding terrorist activities in the United States by HAMAS operatives in the Chicago area.² SA Wright's successful investigation led to the seizure of \$1.4 million of terrorist funds and was the first occasion that the U.S. government used the civil forfeiture laws to seize terrorist assets in the United States.³

Despite the unqualified success of this criminal investigation of terrorism, however, the FBI failed to take seriously the threat of terrorism in the United States and, more specifically, thwarted and obstructed SA Wright's attempts to launch a more comprehensive criminal investigation of the sources and methods of funding terrorism in this country. Worse yet, FBI officials retaliated against SA Wright because, against their wishes, he aggressively continued to pursue a criminal investigation and prosecution of terrorists in the United States. This retaliation evidences an unlawful scheme to discredit and, thereby, silence SA Wright, who has sought to communicate his experience to Congress and others in the public interest.

This Complaint seeks remedies for the FBI's unlawful retaliation against SA Wright and a full and thorough investigation by the OIG of the FBI's illegal cover-up and obstruction of justice. The public interest and safety clearly require such an investigation of the FBI and its attempt to cover-up its negligent dereliction of duty in failing to take seriously the threat of

²Investigating the sources and methods of funding for terrorists is so critical to fighting terrorism that the Bush Administration recently created a task force to identify and interrupt the flow of money to terrorists. This effort, to be run by the U.S. Customs Service, will be composed of 70 persons specializing in tracking illicit money from drugs sales and other illegal activities, as well as agents from the FBI, DOJ, the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

terrorism in the United States. Indeed, had SA Wright been allowed to do his job and had the FBI properly discharged its law enforcement duties to stop terrorists in the United States, the September II, 2001 attacks might not have happened, nor might the American people now be terrorized by the current threat of anthrax being distributed through the U.S. mail system.

I. INTRODUCTION.

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, terrorists associated with Osama bin Laden ("bin Laden"), a U.S. Designated Terrorist⁴ and his Al-Qaeda network of terrorist organizations carried out terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, New York, and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, killing thousands of innocent and unsuspecting persons, as well as hundreds of police, fire and rescue workers, and traumatizing the American public. These attacks were perpetrated by militant Islamic followers of bin Laden that had been trained in terrorist warfare at bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. The perpetrators and their co-conspirators entered the United States with visas approved by U.S. immigration authorities even though some of them were known terrorist suspects. They planned the attacks for several years without detection by the FBI by, among other things, attending various flight training schools throughout the United States to learn how to fly commercial airplanes and scouting the particular flights to be hijacked. They also used stolen credit cards to fund their preparation and living expenses in the United States, and they received wired funds from, and wire-transferred funds to, Al-Qaeda's paymaster in the United Arab Emirates. In short, they were allowed to rent apartments, shop at American stores and otherwise infiltrate into American society.

Then, on what forever will be remembered as a national day of infamy, the terrorist perpetrators passed through airport security at Boston's Logan Airport with knives and box cutters, boarded American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, and then hijacked and crashed the airplanes in the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center, causing the towers to collapse into a massive pile of rubble, killing almost 5,000 innocent persons.

Another group of these terrorists using the same *modus operandi* passed through airport security at Washington-Dulles Airport with knives and box cutters, boarded American Airlines Flight 77, and then hijacked and crashed the airplane into the south side of the Pentagon, killing several hundred more innocent persons. Still another group of these terrorists passed through airport security with knives and box cutters at Newark Airport in Newark, New Jersey, boarded and hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 and, after a struggle with several valiant passengers aboard the flight, crashed the airplane in a field in Stony Creek, Pennsylvania, causing the deaths of all the passengers and crew aboard the flight.

Sadly, the September 11th attacks were not prevented because the FBI failed to take seriously or consciously ignored the security threat posed by known terrorists to U.S. citizens in this country. In the aftermath of the September 11, these terrorist attacks have been called the greatest intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor, and Congress has decided to hold hearings to investigate the intelligence failure of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") in failing to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Additionally, the September 11th attacks are a result, in part, of the FBI's grossly negligent failure to discharge its law enforcement function by refusing to actively pursue criminal investigations and prosecutions of known terrorists in the

United States. According to the Dallas Morning News, the FBI's former counterterrorism chief blamed federal officials, in part, for not taking the terrorism threat more seriously.⁵ As reported by the Dallas Morning News on October 24, 2001, Oliver Revell, former Deputy Director of the FBI, echoed this harsh reality when he stated at a Press Club of Dallas luncheon: "Why didn't we know about September 11? We were deaf, dumb, and blind. We were asleep at the switch." (Id.) Mr. Revell further commented that despite the early warnings sips of previous terrorist attacks since 1992, the United States failed to recognize impending disaster because its federal law enforcement (the FBI) is a "dysfunctional montage." (Id.)

Worse yet, not only was the FBI lax in its failure to actively pursue criminal investigations of terrorists suspects in the United States, but its actions and the actions of some of its agents working intelligence operations also intentionally stifled ongoing criminal investigations of terrorists. In this regard, SA Wright, an 11-year FBI veteran who is an expert in counterterrorism investigations⁶, has criticized the FBI's lack of support for and interference with his criminal investigation of terrorist operatives of the HAMAS terrorist organization. As a result of this criticism, the FBI has retaliated against SA Wright. Moreover, less than ten days after the September 11 attacks, a DOJ official even threatened SA Wright and his counsel, stating that he (the DOJ official) was "tired of Judicial Watch's conspiracy theories" and that, if SA Wright did not speak immediately with his SAC in Chicago, SA Wright and his counsel "would pay the consequences."

Indeed, SA Wright had already met with his Chicago SAC in March 2001 and June 22, 2001, about his terrorism concerns. At that time, he advised the SAC that he had identified the

creation of the entire U.S.-based HAMAS network, including those responsible for it. He warned the SAC that the HAMAS network was "going strong" because the FBI-and particularly the International Terrorism Unit-was not doing anything to stop it. SA Wright further advised the SAC that hundreds of people had already died, including five Americans, and he warned that more people would die in the future because the FBI was not doing its job.

In addition, SA Wright provided the SAC with specific information about an FBI relief supervisor who knowingly and intentionally obstructed SA Wright's investigation. Although no action was taken against the relief supervisor, the SAC did initiate an OPR investigation against SA Wright only weeks following SA Wright's criticism of the FBI.⁷ This retaliatory OPR investigation concerned something related to SA Wright's criminal case that had occurred more than three years earlier. Nevertheless, SA Wright was vindicated when, on October 30, 2001, the initial investigation concluded that "no action" should be taken against SA Wright regarding the retaliatory OPR initiated by the SAC. However, on the same day, SA Wright was informed that he was the subject of another retaliatory OPR investigation-this one initiated by FBI headquarters ("FBIHQ") OPR Unit-for something else that also had occurred three years earlier related to the same case.⁸

This Complaint discusses: (1) the FBI's grossly negligent failure to pursue criminal investigations of counterterrorism and prosecute known terrorists during the months and years leading up to the September 11th terrorist attacks, (2) the apparent reasons for the FBI's abrogation of its law enforcement responsibility to investigate and prosecute terrorists who engage in illegal activities in the United States, and (3) the OPR's arbitrary, erroneous and unfair

decision regarding an unsubstantiated, coercive and retaliatory sexual harassment complaint against SA Wright, Case No. 66F-HQ-1261091 Sub D, and the FBI's further retaliation in removing SA Wright from his counterterrorism duties, all in an attempt to discredit and silence him.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

A. Early Warning Signs That Americans Were Specifically Targeted By Bin Laden.

Terrorism has been rampant in the Middle East for decades. During the last decade, the incidence of terrorist attacks on Americans has increased with alarming frequency. Since at least 1992, and maybe earlier, the FBI unmistakably has been on notice that the United States and its citizens have been, and continue to be, prime targets of terrorist attacks in the United States and abroad perpetrated by bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network of terrorist organizations. The early warning signs of the threat posed by terrorist associates of bin Laden include, but are not limited to, the following terrorist attacks: (a) the 1992 declaration by Al-Qaeda that the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia and Yemen should be attacked; (b) the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center killing six Americans and wounding more than a thousand others; (c) the 1995 murder of 18 U.S. servicemen in Mogadishu, Somalia, and the parading of one serviceman's body through the streets as a means of holding the United States up to public ridicule; (d) the 1995 car bomb explosion outside the American-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five Americans and two others; (e) the 1996 Khobar, Towers bombing, killing 19 Americans and injuring hundreds of other persons; (f) bin Laden's formal Declaration of War against the United States in 1996; (g) the 1998 "fatwah" (or religious ruling)

issued by the International Islamic Front For Jihad Against Jews And Crusaders and endorsed by bin Laden urging Muslims to kill Americans, including civilians, wherever they may be found; (h) the 1998 indictment of bin Laden in New York in connection with the bombing of the World Trade Center; (I) the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 234 persons, including 12 Americans, and injuring more than 500 others; (j) bin Laden's indictment in 1998 in the United States on a total of 224 counts of murder in connection with the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa; (k) bin Laden's interview on Qatar television in 1999 again declaring war against the United States; and (l) the suicide bombing in 2000 of the U.S.S. Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39 others on board the ship. Individually and collectively, these prior terrorist attacks against Americans made it imperative that the FBI take seriously the threat to Americans posed by bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and their terrorist allies, and, in response to this threat, actively conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions of terrorists to root out the terrorist operatives and "sleeper" cells operating in the United States as to neutralize the threat. By neglecting to take this terrorism threat seriously, the FBI has abdicated its essential law enforcement function, leaving the American public at great risk and danger as punctuated so horrifically by the September 11th attacks.

B. SA Wright's Criminal Investigation of the HAMAS Terrorist Organization in the United States.

SA Wright became an FBI agent in 1990.⁹ In October 1993, for safety reasons following a fatal shooting incident¹⁰, he was transferred from the Kansas City Division to the Chicago Division¹¹. He was assigned to the FBI Chicago Division's Joint Terrorism Task Force ("JTTF")

and investigated terrorist activity by operatives of HAMAS³ in the Chicago area and eventually throughout the United States. As part of this task force, he became particularly familiar with the techniques generally used by international terrorist organizations to surreptitiously move and launder money in and out of the United States, including through the use of domestic financial institutions, in support of extortionate terrorist and paramilitary activities and operations in the United States and abroad¹².

After only four months of working on the JTTF, SA Wright recognized that many of the terrorist suspects in the Chicago area were actively involved in well-organized criminal activities. Specifically, SA Wright learned, among other things, that HAMAS had established a significant presence in the United States. In order to train and equip HAMAS terrorists abroad, HAMAS utilized non-profit organizations such as the Holy Land Foundation and other front organizations in the United States. These were utilized by HAMAS to recruit, organize, train and support HAMAS terrorist operatives and to plan and carry out terrorist attacks.¹⁴ Indeed, many of the Chicago terrorist subjects were business owners and leaders of non-profit organizations. SA Wright, therefore, appropriately concluded that following the money trail and seizing terrorists' assets would be an effective means of neutralizing the terrorism threat.

After investigating a low-level HAMAS operative and learning about the HAMAS

³HAMAS is an acronym of the Arabic term for "The Islamic Resistance Movement" -- Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyya. It is an independent terrorist political organization founded in the Israeli Occupied Territories in 1987 at the beginning of the Intifada, the Palestinian-led campaign to resist Israeli political domination of the occupied territories. HAMAS, which is an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood ("MB"), has engaged in more than a decade-long campaign of subversive and violent activity, commonly denominated as terrorist activity, undertaken primarily in Israel, and supported in part by illegal activities in the United States, including but not limited to money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.

enterprise in the United States, SA Wright realized that HAMAS had developed an extensive Chicago-based network.¹⁵ SA Wright eventually opened an investigation pertaining to Mohammed Salah, a high-level HAMAS operative who was a naturalized American citizen and Chicago-area resident. Salah, who had been a HAMAS operative of Marzook, a U.S. Designated Terrorist, responsible for recruiting and training terrorists in the United States, had been arrested in Israel in 1993 for his membership and participation in HAMAS. In January 1995, Salah, a U.S. Designated Terrorist, pled guilty in an Israeli military court and was sentenced to five years imprisonment for being a member of HAMAS and to illegally channeling funds to HAMAS, including funds transferred through an account he held jointly with his wife at the LaSalle Talman Bank in Chicago.¹⁶ SA Wright's investigation eventually expanded to encompass a relative of Mohammad Salah,¹⁷ and the Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI"),¹⁸ a purportedly tax-exempt organization in Chicago whose officers funneled money to Salah to fund his terrorist activities for HAMAS.

During this investigation, SA Wright realized that neither FBI headquarters ("FBIHQ") nor any of the FBI's Field Divisions were conducting a nationwide criminal investigation of the HAMAS criminal enterprise in the United States. Although each FBI division was conducting a local investigation of HAMAS operatives within the division's jurisdiction, the results of these local investigations were not being utilized in a nationwide effort to fully identify and neutralize HAMAS terrorists in the United States.

Therefore, in August 1995, following the arrest of HAMAS leader Mousa Abu Marzook in New York,¹⁹ SA Wright laid the groundwork to establish a nationwide criminal investigation

of HAMAS. The goals of this more comprehensive criminal investigation were: (a) to identify and neutralize the growing HAMAS threat to U.S. interests and policies by investigating the methods and sources of funds used by HAMAS operatives in the United States; (b) to identify the methods of transferring funds from the United States to HAMAS in the Occupied Territories; and © to identify the U.S. organizations established and utilized to further its terrorist missions.²⁰ "SA Wright has caused the issuance of numerous subpoenas, for records in the (Vulgar Betrayal) investigation. In order to have the AUSA issue these subpoenas, it had been necessary for SA Wright to organize his information...to justify the AUSA to procure these subpoenas. Upon receiving the fruits of these subpoenas, usually bank records, it has been necessary for SA Wright to review and organize literally thousands of documents."²¹

During his investigation, SA Wright uncovered a scheme to funnel money to HAMAS. Yassin Kadi (a/k/a Yasin al-Qadi) -- a Saudi Arabian businessman, a U.S. Designated Terrorist and an alleged financier of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda²² -- wired \$820,000 from a Swiss account to a Chicago-area land developer (Golden Marble, Inc.) to purchase a certain piece of land.²³ The development of this property was controlled by QLI and the rental income from the property, which escaped U.S. tax because QLI was a tax-exempt entity, was transferred by QLI's officers to Salah to fund HAMAS terrorist activities. (Id.) This investigation successfully led to the seizure of approximately \$1.4 million of assets belonging to the Salahs and QLI pursuant to the money laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(2) and the forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. §981. (Id.) Equally important, SA Wright's investigation eliminated a source of funding for terrorist operations and neutralized a present terrorist threat in the United States.

The success of SA Wright's investigation demonstrates the effectiveness of criminal investigations and prosecutions as a means of combating domestic terrorism. And the September 11th attacks show the disastrous consequences that can result from the FBI's failure to actively pursue criminal investigations and prosecutions of known terrorists operating in the United States.

III. THE REASONS FOR THE FBI'S FAILURE TO PURSUE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS OF KNOWN TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

A. The FBI's Negligent Failure to Clarify the Guidelines for Opening Criminal Investigations in Domestic Terrorism Matters.

The FBI's important law enforcement role in the war against terrorism is to reduce and/or neutralize the threat of terrorism in the United States and against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests throughout the world.²⁴ The FBI's terrorism investigations are governed by two sets of guidelines. The guidelines for Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence investigations ("Foreign Intelligence Guidelines") cover the FBI's investigations of international terrorism, that is, terrorism occurring outside the United States.²⁵ Pursuant to these guidelines, the FBI collects intelligence information, analyzes the information and then uses such information to prevent terrorist activity and, whenever possible, to aid in the arrest and prosecution of persons or groups engaged in international terrorism. Domestic terrorism investigations, on the other hand, are governed by the Domestic Guidelines, which rely on federal and state criminal statutes, including but not limited to racketeering, conspiracy, money laundering and the like, as the basis for criminal prosecutions of persons engaged in terrorist

activities in the United States.(Id.)

The Domestic Guidelines and the Foreign Intelligence guidelines provide the FBI sufficient legal authority to conduct its investigations of terrorism activity.(Id.) However, because of confusion within the FBI and lack of proper direction from FBIHQ, FBI agents often have been in doubt about whether to apply the Foreign Intelligence Guidelines or the Domestic Guidelines to a terrorism investigation. This lack of clarity has contributed to a risk-adverse culture within the FBI that causes some FBI agents to refrain from taking prompt action against known or suspected terrorists.(Id.) Indeed, many FBI agents erroneously believe that the Foreign Intelligence Guidelines must be applied if the subject of the investigation is foreign-born. What's more, many agents incorrectly believe that subjects of investigations conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Guidelines may not be investigated for criminal activity in the United States unless such criminal activity is linked directly to acts of international terrorism. As shown below, the FBI often has turned a blind eye to the criminal activity of terrorists in the United States under the rationale of gathering intelligence.

When SA Wright was assigned to the JTTF in Chicago, his attempt to open traditional criminal cases against terrorist operatives in the United States initially was rebuffed. He was told by his supervisor that no criminal cases could be opened and worked against any foreign-born terrorists identified in secret intelligence investigations. The result was that, at great risk to the American public, the FBI allowed foreign-born terrorist operatives (like the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks) to engage in illegal activity (such as money laundering and credit card fraud) in the United States while FBI intelligence agents gathered information about these

operatives purportedly for 'analysis and future action in the event that a terrorist act (such as the September 11th attacks) ever occurred.

Unfortunately, the FBI was lax in clarifying the guidelines for opening criminal investigations of terrorist suspects and, thus, few such criminal investigations were pursued. In 1995, after the bombing of the Murray Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the DOJ issued a memorandum to the FBI field offices attempting to clarify the circumstances that would merit opening a preliminary inquiry and full investigation under the Domestic Guidelines. However, this DOJ communication was ineffective in clarifying the confusion among FBI international terrorism agents and their continued use of the Foreign Intelligence Guidelines instead of the Domestic Guidelines to neutralize terrorists in the United States. (Id.)

As mentioned above, after he had made repeated requests, SA Wright finally opened an investigation pertaining to the activity of Mohammed Salah, a relative of Salah's, and QLI, all of which were subjects in the Chicago area that were involved with funding terrorist activities by HAMAS. After he had been working on the investigation for some time, SA Wright recognized that HAMAS was, in essence, an organized crime family that should be investigated as a criminal enterprise rather than investigating individual terrorists as the FBI had been doing. In November 1995, SA Wright explained to Associate Special Agent in Charge ("ASA") Floyd Adams of the Chicago office that, through his investigation, he intended to create a database of information collected in his investigation and use this information to link all of the HAMAS subjects in the United States. The "...charities could provide excellent cover for terrorist groups, because relief workers are welcomed almost everywhere and their shipment and

supplies are rarely checked by boarder guards or the police.²⁶ Using this database of information, FBI investigators could quickly identify vital information on suspected terrorists and critical information on all HAMAS businesses, charity and non-profit front organizations. However, ASAC Adams told SA Wright the FBI would not be able to undertake such an investigation because it was too expensive, too time-consuming and too broad in scope; therefore, ASAC Adams dismissed SA Wright's suggestion to broaden the investigation beyond the Chicago area subjects.

The FBI's conscious failure to undertake criminal investigations of suspected terrorists in the United States was further demonstrated in March 1996. At that time, managers from the FBIHQ Counterterrorism Division met with the JTTF in Chicago and admitted to SA Wright that no one at FBIHQ reviewed and attempted to link all the reports filed by the FBI field offices regarding terrorist activities in the United States. It was further conceded that the field office reports merely were filed and maintained at FBIHQ for future retrieval in the event that an act of terrorism occurred. This lack of a coordinated national counterterrorism effort by the FBI has had disastrous consequences.

Terrorist attacks such the 1998 attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Africa should have been prevented. During 1997, SA Wright predicted terrorist would strike a U.S. interest abroad within the next two years. He even predicted at least one of the many known U.S.-based non-profit front organizations would be linked to the location of the future attack. When SA Wright informed FBIHQ of his concerns, they simply ignored him. Fortunately, there are several individuals who can verify this information. Following the 1998 attacks in Africa, when SA

Wright contacted a co-worker at FBIHQ, she immediately stated, "I have been waiting for your call. You were right! You knew this was going to happen fifteen months ago. Why did no one listen to you." SA Wright replied, "Because they don't care. If they actually figured out the danger existed, they might have to put in an extra hour of overtime. It's so pathetic! Realizing this day was coming, remember what I asked you to do fifteen months ago?" She answered, "Yes. Do you want me to fax the report to you?" SA Wright answered, "Yes. Believe it or not, I hope I am wrong about this. I would hate to think we could have prevented this had someone in the Terrorism Unit actually done their job." Unfortunately, the report SA Wright received only supported his suspicions from fifteen months earlier.

Following the embassy bombings, Judith Miller, Middle East Reporter, The New York Times, wrote, "One instance in which investigators said they believed that the role of charities was crucial was the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, crimes that killed more than 200 people and wounded thousands. Prosecutors said material seized from the Nairobi office of the Mercy International Relief Agency includes records of calls to the cellular telephone of Mr. Bin Laden. ... The list of more than 30 groups with suspected ties includes two in the United States, the Global Relief Foundation, Inc. and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, in Richardson Texas."²⁷

Unfortunately for the victims of terrorist attacks, FBIHQ failed to prevent terrorist acts, such as the U.S. embassy bombings in North Africa and the September 11th attacks. Instead, the FBI was so derelict that it merely attempted to apprehend the terrorists after the act of terrorism had been perpetrated and the damage had been done.

Not only did the FBI consciously fail to actively pursue criminal investigations of

terrorist subjects in the United States, but it also intentionally frustrated or thwarted SA Wright's investigation. For example, Elmer Murphy, an attorney in the Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section of DOJ in Washington, D.C. was investigating one of the U.S.-based HAMAS front organizations that provided material support for HAMAS' terrorist -activities. Murphy initially showed an interest in SA Wright's investigation and, in accordance with his request, received several briefings about its status. Murphy, however, believed that SA Wright's investigation was concerned too much with historical or dated information and did not believe that seizure of the \$1.6 million which SA Wright had linked to Salah and HAMAS was a realistic goal because neither the FBI nor DOJ had previously use the civil forfeiture laws to seize terrorists' assets in the United States. The investigation ultimately resulted in the seizure of only \$1.4 million of the \$1.6 million because of unnecessary delays attributable to Murphy, who repeatedly sought to postpone the legal action to seize the assets and raised questions regarding the possible negative ramifications of such civil seizures and concerns that such a seizure might somehow require SA Wright to testify in future civil court proceedings about intelligence secrets. During the period of these delays, \$200,000 of the HAMAS funds was moved.

Despite the undeniable success of SA Wright's investigation of HAMAS, the investigation was eventually terminated in an apparent decision by the FBI to effectively close down its investigation of HAMAS.

B. FBI Failed to Reign in Agents Conducting Intelligence Operations Who Viewed Criminal Investigations As An Encroachment on Their Turf.

Counterterrorism intelligence operations are both expensive and time-consuming. These attributes create a built-in incentive on the part of some FBI agents engaged in such intelligence operations to protect their turf and their jobs by resisting any attempt to open a criminal investigation as to any subject of their intelligence cases. Regrettably, the largest obstacles to SA Wright's criminal investigation of the HAMAS enterprise in the United States were the management of the Chicago field office and the FBIHQ's Counterterrorism Division in Washington, D.C., who wanted to protect FBI intelligence operations, even at the cost of allowing terrorists to engage in illegal activities in the United States, such as recruiting and training terrorists and funding terrorist activities, without being criminally prosecuted for such activities.

As discussed above, when SA Wright was assigned to the JTTF, FBI agents in the JTTF were generally opposed to opening domestic criminal investigations of terrorist subjects and, instead, chose to pursue intelligence investigations of those subjects. SA Wright was told initially by his supervisor that he could not open any criminal investigation on a secret intelligence subject. In 1994, when SA Wright complained that the FBI was merely gathering intelligence so they would know who to arrest after the terrorist act occurred, his supervisor, surprisingly, agreed that was true.

At FBIHQ, the Counterterrorism Division also was putting the brakes on the, opening of criminal investigations. For example, SSA Barney Clinton of the Counterterrorism Division was particularly interested in curtailing or terminating SA Wright's investigation of HAMAS. In late

1998, SSA Clinton convened a conference at FBIHQ to determine whether SA Wright's investigation should be terminated. Although SSA Clinton claimed to be concerned that SA Wright's investigation might interfere with an ongoing intelligence investigation of HAMAS, however, the senior agent responsible for that ongoing intelligence case readily admitted to SA Wright that the intelligence case was going nowhere and that, after one year, they still hadn't begun to collect any intelligence information. Thereafter, from approximately December 1998 until approximately January 1999, SSA Clinton continued his efforts to limit SA Wright's investigation. To this end, SSA Clinton told SA Wright's supervisor and others that SA Wright was "out of control" and that his investigation should be limited as much as possible.

New criminal investigations of known and suspected terrorists in the United States also were not desired by the FBI international terrorism unit because of a concerted effort on the part of agents conducting counterterrorism intelligence investigations to insulate the subjects of their investigations from criminal investigation and prosecution so these agents could perpetuate their intelligence operations. In retrospect, after the September 11th attacks, this is disturbing! Worse yet, it appears that FBI agents in the Chicago field office intentionally withheld information vital to SA Wright's investigation. One such incident involved Relief Supervisor SA Jack Ewing. Ewing was the agent on the JTTF most antagonistic to opening criminal investigations of terrorist subjects. For months, the JTTF had been interested in obtaining the confession made by Salah to Israeli authorities after his arrest in 1993. When the confession finally was received in the Chicago field office, SA Ewing, who knew it was an important and eagerly anticipated document, initialed it and buried it in the files of SA Wright and several

other agents without telling anyone. Subsequently, when agents in the office were searching for another misplaced document, SA Wright and two other agents discovered the Salah confession buried in their files. When the Salah confession eventually was discovered, the incident was brought to the attention of the JTTF supervisor, but nothing was done about it.

Another incident involving SA Ewing began with a call from an agent in another FBI division office. The agent told SA Wright that in 1988, he had opened a criminal investigation of several persons who were now subjects of SA Wright's investigation. The case had been closed in the early 1990's but the agent had not destroyed all the records collected during the case. He agreed to send SA Wright five boxes of records. When SA Wright asked SA Ewing if Ewing had been aware of the other FBI divisions investigation and the information developed, Ewing responded affirmatively. When SA Wright asked why Ewing had never said anything about it to SA Wright, Ewing walked away in apparent disgust.

A third incident involving SA Ewing concerned SA Wright's efforts to locate two HAMAS terrorists residing in the Chicago area. These terrorists were Shareef Alwan ("Alwan")²⁸ and Razick Saleh Abdel Razick ("Razick").²⁹ When he began to search for these terrorists, SA Wright asked SA Ewing if he (Ewing) had any information concerning these terrorists.⁴ Ewing replied that he did not. SA Wright then spent several weeks investigating the whereabouts of these terrorists. One afternoon while SA Wright and SA John Vincent were in the office discussing whether to contact a friend abroad who could tell them something about Alwan. Overhearing their plan, SA Ewing realized SA's Wright and Vincent were going to discover he had lied and withheld vital information for years from SA Wright regarding Alwan.

SA Ewing finally disclosed that he knew that Alwan had been arrested previously by the Israelis. This is another incident forming a pattern by Ewing of withholding information from SA Wright to frustrate and thwart his criminal investigation.

These incidents dramatically illustrate the uneasy and counterproductive tension between FBI intelligence investigations and FBI criminal investigations of the same terrorist subjects. The FBI has been grossly negligent in failing to police its intelligence agents, and the resulting "turf battles" within the FBI have led to a dereliction of duty by the FBI in failing to criminally investigate terrorists so as to prevent them from committing terrorist acts. This has left Americans exposed to terrorist threats and acts of violence, such as the September 11th tragedy and the current anthrax crisis.

C. The FBI's Reluctance to Investigate All Persons and Entities with Connections to bin Laden, the bin Laden Family, Kadi and Saudi Arabia.

The FBI's failure to actively conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions of known and suspected terrorist associates of bin Laden also appears to be the result of its reluctance to investigate all persons and entities with known ties to bin Laden and his family in Saudi Arabia. For example, in 1998, SA Wright's criminal investigation identified Yassin Kadi (a/k/a Yasin Al-Qadi) and his company, Kadi International, Inc., (collectively, "Kadi"), as a source of funding for HAMAS operatives in the United States.³⁰ As previously mentioned herein and detailed in SA Wright's June 8, 1998, affidavit filed in federal court supporting the above-referenced government seizure of approximately \$1.4 million of terrorist assets, Kadi, acting pursuant to specific instructions from the president of QLI, wire-transferred \$820,000 from a Swiss bank

account to Golden Marble, Inc. ("Golden Marble"), a Chicago-area real estate developer, to purchase certain real property in Woodridge, Illinois. (Id.) The development of the property was actually controlled by QLI, a HAMAS front organization masquerading as a tax-exempt charitable organization whose officers gave money to a HAMAS operative to fund HAMAS' terrorist activities. (Id.).

- As part of his investigation, SA Wright had a subpoena issued to the XYZ Co.

According to SA Wright, ABU-ABU, a Muslim employee at XYZ Co. approached his friend who was a Muslim FBI agent in another FBI division, regarding the subpoenas. Apparently, a high ranking official of the XYZ Co. had asked Abu-Abu to contact his FBI agent-friend to arrange a meeting between the high ranking XYZ Co. official and the Muslim FBI agent to discuss the Chicago investigation being conducted by SA Wright.³¹ Abu-Abu told the Muslim FBI agent that he (Abu-Abu) was concerned the XYZ Co. may be linked to two recent terrorist attacks against U.S. interest. Abu-Abu suspected this because the XYZ co. was associated with a non-profit organization linked to the recent terrorists attacks abroad.

When the Muslim FBI agent advised SA Wright what Abu-Abu had related to him, SA Wright immediately conveyed this information to his supervisor and the appropriate U.S. Attorneys Office. (Id. Pg. 4) Shortly thereafter, SA Wright and his co-case agent, SA John Vincent, met with Assistant U.S. Attorneys Flessner, Ferguson and Channenson. Together, they called the Muslim FBI agent and his supervisor on a telephone conference call and asked the Muslim FBI agent to meet with the high ranking XYZ Co. official and to wear a wire to record the conversation. (Id. Pg. 5) Astonishingly, the Muslim FBI agent agreed to wear a wire only if he could tell the subject that he was recording the conversation. (Id.) The Muslim FBI agent told

them that he feared for his safety and did not trust the FBI to protect him. (Id.) When the Muslim FBI agent was questioned as to why wearing a wire was any different than writing a report of the conversation after the fact, he stated that it was a "cultural matter that you wouldn't understand" and that "a Muslim does not record another Muslim." (Id.) Thus, an important opportunity to investigate the XYZ Co. and Yasin Kadi was thwarted and lost by FBI inaction.

Kadi was not only linked to the XYZ Co. but he also sits on the board of directors of *Global Diamond Resources, Inc.*, a company that has diamond-mining operations in South Africa.³² In 1997, the bin Laden family became a major investor in this company. (Id.) One year later, Kadi agreed to provide \$3 million to the company. (Id.)

For three years, the FBI and the federal government took no action against Kadi or his assets. Only after the September 11th attacks were Kadi's assets in the United States frozen as part of the action taken by the U.S. Treasury Department pursuant to President Bush's Executive Order 13224 on October 12, 2001, to freeze the assets of all associates and supporters of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network of terrorist organizations.³³

Kadi is by no means the only Saudi link with international terrorism. It has been publicly reported in the press that National Security Agency ("NSA") electronic intercepts of conversations among members of the Saudi Arabian royal family disclosed that, by 1996, Saudi money was supporting bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, as well as other terrorist groups operating in the Middle East.³⁴ Contrary to the Saudis' denials, these NSA intercepts demonstrate that the Saudi regime was aware that substantial funds given by the Saudi monarchy to various Islamic charities were being funneled to bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. (Id.) In addition

to these intercepts, it has been reported that Mohammed el-Khilewi, the first secretary at the Saudi Mission to the United Nations who defected to and sought political asylum in the United States in 1994, has documents showing that the Saudis have provided financial and technical support to HAMAS. (Id.)

Further troubling is that, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the Saudis have refused to help the FBI and the CIA run "traces," or background checks, on the nineteen terrorists who carried out those attacks, even though more than half of them are believed to be from Saudi Arabia. (Id.) Furthermore, the Saudis have not been as cooperative as hoped in aiding the United States in its war against bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Although the Saudis have permitted the United States to utilize the U.S. command and control center located in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have prohibited the United States from launching any military actions from Saudi soil. Cognizant that Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the Middle East, the U.S. government has treaded softly in dealing with the Saudis, in part, to protect American economic interests and the interests of U.S. oil companies doing business in Saudi Arabia. Thus, it appears that, over the years, political and economic concerns of the United States have caused the FBI and the CIA to less than aggressively pursue Kadi and other Saudi links to bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and terrorism in general.

Further, the FBI has been reluctant to aggressively investigate all persons and organizations associated with the bin Laden family in Saudi Arabia. Such timidity may be attributable, in part, to a desire not to disturb close relationships between U.S. officials and key

figures in the Saudi regime and not to disclose conflicts of interest on the part of banks, oil companies and private investor groups, such as the Carlyle Group, that do business with the bin Laden family.^{35 36} The following are examples of such relationships and potential conflicts of interest:

(1) the family of Osama bin Laden in Saudi Arabia has been an investor in certain investment funds of the Carlyle Group, a private U.S. merchant bank specializing in buyouts of defense and aerospace companies. (Id.) The Carlyle Group is backed by former President George Herbert Walker Bush and former British Prime Minister John Major, who are paid consultants or their agents (Id.);

(2) because of its investment with the Carlyle Group and its close ties to the Saudi royal family, the bin Laden family has been visited in Saudi Arabia by many 24 important former U.S. officials, including former President George H. W. Bush, former Secretary of State James Baker and former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, each of whom is affiliated with or is connected with the Carlyle Group (Id.);

(3) the Carlyle Group also has had a business relationship with the bin Laden Group, a West African conglomerate owned by the family of Osama bin Laden, (Id.);

(4) it has been reported that the family of Osama bin Laden have banking connections with Citigroup, Inc., the London branch of Deutsche Bank AG, ABN Amro, and the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia (Id.);

(5) it also has been reported that the FBI has been "remarkably sensitive, tactful and protective" of bin Laden's family, especially during the current crisis (Id.);

(6) former President Carter met with ten of Osama bin Laden's brothers early in 2000 on a fund-raising trip for the Carter Center in Atlanta (Id.);

(7) the bin Laden family's close ties to the Saudi royal family prompted executives and staff from closely-held Forbes, Inc. to make two trips to the bin Laden family's headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Id.);

(8) at least one former high-level government official has attempted to work for or obtain work from Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States; (9) finally, the current Bush administration still has not frozen or attempted to seize all the U.S. assets of HAMAS, which was the subject of SA Wright's investigation, or the U.S. assets of Hezbollah despite the continuing terrorist acts carried out by these groups in the Middle East.

IV. THE INJUSTICE DONE TO SA WRIGHT AND THE CLEAR NEED TO RECTIFY IT.

SA Wright is one of the finest counterterrorism agents in the FBI, and his "Exceptional" performance evaluations while he was in the JTTF confirm this fact.^{37 38 39 40} It is apparent now that his downfall at the FBI was that he pushed too hard to conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions of known terrorists operating in the United States and to prosecute them as a means of neutralizing the threat they posed. Additionally, he was openly critical when his attempts to

aggressively investigate terrorists in the United States were dismissed out of hand by FBI officials. On August 9, 1999, SA Wright was relieved of his counterterrorism duties and re-assigned to handling applicant matters.⁴¹ Regrettably, in the two years since then, the 19 terrorists who carried out the September 11th attacks were in the United States planning and preparing to carry out their mission from bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The FBI's counterterrorism intelligence operations in the United States utterly failed to neutralize the threat posed by these terrorists. Because of the FBI's gross negligence in failing to take seriously the threat of terrorism, it did not apprehend these terrorists in time to prevent their horrific acts.

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the FBI has sought to cover up and obstruct justice concerning its gross negligence and dereliction of duty in failing to investigate terrorist activity in the United States. Specifically, the FBI retaliated against SA Wright, who has been critical of the FBI's failure to actively pursue criminal investigations and prosecutions of known terrorists in the United States. The primary vehicle for silencing and discrediting SA Wright was an uncorroborated sexual harassment charge made by SA Cybil Reed ("SA Reed") against him.⁴² As shown below, in its administrative review of this unsubstantiated and baseless charge, the OPR has denied SA Wright fundamental due process of law by failing to interview SA Wright's witnesses and failing to question SA Reed about the facts that undermined her charge, among other things. Perpetuating the FBI's retaliation against SA Wright, the OPR, without even a complete evidentiary record, rushed to judgment and upheld the baseless charge in an apparent effort to discredit SA Wright. As punishment for SA Wright in this case, the OPR

ignored the recommendation of "no days off" made by the SAC of the Chicago office and meted out a thirty day suspension without pay and one year of probation. Since returning to duty, SA Wright has been assigned to duties other than counter-terrorism investigations, notwithstanding his expertise in such investigations and the FBI's dire need for experienced counterterrorism criminal investigators in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.⁵

As shown below, SA Medernach's sexual harassment charge is not corroborated by other independent evidence. The unvarnished evidence indicates that she encouraged SA Wright's attention, particularly on two business trips abroad, and that SA Wright's conduct toward her was never offensive or sexually inappropriate. Accordingly, the OPR should reverse its prior decision and enter findings of fact in favor of SA Wright.

An impartial and dispassionate review of the evidence in this case demonstrates that the following key facts are indisputable:

1. SA Wright was assigned to the Chicago field office while SA Reed was assigned to the Milwaukee field office.⁴³
2. SA Wright and SA Reed met when SA Wright attended a briefing of the agents in Milwaukee concerning the subject of an investigation he had been conducting out of the Chicago office.
3. As a part of his investigation in the Chicago office, SA Wright identified and began to

⁵Since September 11, 2001, counterterrorism has become the FBI's Number One priority and the FBI has arrested or detained more than 600 suspects and material witnesses who are believed to pose or have knowledge of terrorist activities in the United States.

investigate a suspected terrorist, who was directly linked to terrorist activities by other subjects of his investigation.(Id. ¶ 11) Because this subject of SA Wright's investigation happened to be a resident in the Milwaukee area, SA Reed opened a parallel investigation of him.(Id. ¶ 12)

4. SA Reed demanded to FBIHQ that "her" case be given precedence and that she be assigned to be the "lead" agent with the longer-standing Chicago investigation as secondary.

5. Initially, it was decided that the Milwaukee office would handle the one phase of the investigation of the subject and the Chicago office would handle a different phase of the investigation.(Id. ¶ 15)

6. In January 1999, SA Wright and SA Reed traveled to abroad, together with other FBI agents and DOJ personnel, to conduct interviews to aid the Vulgar Betrayal investigation. During this trip, SA Reed made every effort to associate with SA Wright by, among other things, changing her assigned seat on a flight to sit next to him, jointly purchasing and sharing bottles of wine with SA Wright in his hotel room while assisting him in drafting investigative paperwork, taking a side trip with him outside the company of the other FBI agents and DOJ personnel on the main trip. After SA Reed had consumed three bottles of wine with SA Wright in his hotel room one evening on this trip, he gave her an innocent kiss on the forehead when she left his room.

7. During this trip, SA Reed made statements to SA Wright to the effect that it was "scary how well they got along" and how she now understood why some people have affairs. SA

Reed encouraged the attention of SA Wright on this trip.

8. After this trip, however, SA Reed attempted to expand her investigation so that it would completely parallel the Chicago investigation. This action by SA Reed raised legitimate FBI concerns as to confusion and duplication of effort between the Chicago and Milwaukee investigations. When SA Wright attempted to persuade her to curtail her efforts to enlarge her case, SA Reed complained to her supervisor. about voice-mail telephone messages left by SA Wright concerning her investigation. However, after listening to the messages, her supervisor found nothing at all improper about them. Notably, although she did complain to her supervisor about innocuous voice-mail messages left by SA Wright concerning her investigation, she never complained to him about any other conduct of SA Wright and specifically the alleged conduct that is the gravamen of her sexual harassment charge.

9. SA Reed, on some occasions, called SA Wright at his home to discuss their respective cases. On one such occasion, she inquired as to some music playing in the background. SA Wright told her that he was recording some fast beat music to listen 'to in the car or while he was working out. As he was making tapes of this music for himself and others, he promised to send her a copy of the tape too. She did not tell him not to send this tape, nor did she return the tape after she had received it or advise anyone, particularly any FBI officials, that she considered the tape to be offensive or part of a pattern of sexual harassment.

10. Prior to a return trip to Israel, SA Reed remarked to SA Wright that he "had better pack the corkscrew." Apparently, SA Reed was planning on drinking wine with SA

Wright as she had done on their first business trip. If SA Wright's "unsolicited" kiss on her forehead on the first trip had really been offensive to SA Reed, she would never have sought again to engage in the same fraternization that apparently had led to the innocent kiss on the first trip.

11. SA Reed made the airline reservations for herself and SA Wright on this second trip, and she and SA Wright agreed to sit together on the flights. Just prior to the return flight, SA Wright misplaced his ticket and obtained a new ticket and new seat assignment. Unbeknownst to SA Wright, SA Reed, on her own initiative, changed her seat so that she would be sitting next to SA Wright. This also undermines SA Reed's sexual harassment claim because she would never have shown such a strong desire to sit next to SA Wright had he been sexually harassing her as she later alleged.

12. In May 1999, SA Reed received a transfer to the FBI field office in Indianapolis. (Id. ¶ 3) ⁴⁴

13. After receiving the transfer to Indianapolis, SA Reed had a telephone conversation with SA Wright in which they discussed, among other things, his long-standing desire to move to Indianapolis. During this conversation, she encouraged SA Wright to place his name on the Indianapolis transfer list and informed him that a senior FBI would soon be retiring and his retirement would create an opening in Indianapolis that SA Wright would likely get. SA Wright told SA Reed that he would think about it.

14. After SA Wright had placed his name on the transfer list for Indianapolis, SA Reed called SA Wright about the ongoing investigations. During this conversation, quite

contrary to her earlier encouragement to him to seek a transfer to Indianapolis, she suddenly became incensed at the thought that SA Wright might be transferred to Indianapolis.

15. After this conversation occurred, the SACs of the Chicago and Milwaukee offices decided that the Milwaukee investigation would be closed and consolidated into the Chicago investigation. When she learned of this, SA Reed became very irate and complained for two hours to her supervisor that SA Wright "had won." (Id. ¶ 15-17)

16. SA Reed lodged her sexual harassment charge against SA Wright two days after she learned that "her" case in Milwaukee would be closed and that the Chicago office would handle "her" investigation. She held SA Wright responsible for her being instructed to close out her case. (Id. ¶ 23)

17. SA Medernach's sexual harassment complaint against SA Wright is based on four allegedly inappropriate acts:

First, While on the first of two business trips abroad with SA Reed and others, SA Wright gave SA Reed a n "unsolicited" kiss on the forehead as she left his hotel room after they had consumed three bottles of wine while working on a list of questions to ask at an interview scheduled for the next day. This allegation is undermined by the fact that SA Reed did not object to the kiss at the time it was made, nor did she confront him to tell him that she considered it to be offensive. According to SA Reed, she merely told SA Wright on the next day that she was happily married and did not want to have an affair with him—even though SA Wright had not intended nor sought any romantic affair with her. Furthermore, this purported statement by SA Reed is undercut by the fact that she clearly encouraged the attention of SA Wright both during

and after this trip and made a comment to him such as "Now I understand why people have affairs." Although the fraternization between SA Wright and SA Reed on this trip might be argued to have been "unprofessional," it was nevertheless consensual and not sexual; hence, it could not have constituted sexual harassment. Nothing occurred other than an innocent kiss on the forehead between friends and it was interpreted as such at the time. SA Reed also failed to contemporaneously report this conduct to any FBI officials until approximately seven months later, when she was forced to close "her" case.

Second, on three occasions between January and March 1999, SA Wright allegedly made reference during a telephone conversation with SA Reed to a dream he had about her. SA Wright never told SA Reed what the dream was about, so she had no reason to construe his comment as sexual harassment. SA Wright has stated in this proceeding that the dream was not sexual and that sworn statement is un rebutted. Although SA Reed now alleges that SA Wright's references to this "dream" made her uncomfortable, her allegation is undercut by the fact that she never confronted SA Wright to tell him it was inappropriate and never complained to her supervisor or other FBI officials until after she was forced to close "her" case.

Third, in February 1999, SA Wright sent two unsolicited gifts to SA Reed, specifically a tape of music and a Valentine's Day card. During a telephone call placed by SA Reed to SA Wright at his home, SA Reed inquired about some music playing in the background. SA Wright told her he was recording fast beat music on a tape for listening to in the car or while working out and that he promised to send her a copy. She did not tell him at that

time not to send the tape. With the tape, SA Wright also sent a non-romantic Valentine's Day card that he thought was humorous and would amuse her too. SA Reed did not contemporaneously complain about either of these innocent "gifts." Indeed, several days after receiving these items, SA Reed called SA Wright and told him she understood the inside joke behind the card. This allegation has no substance on its face. Like the other allegations, it is undercut by the fact that SA Reed never confronted SA Wright to tell him these gifts were inappropriate or offensive and they clearly were not sexual in nature. Furthermore, SA Reed never complained to her supervisor or any other FBI officials about these gifts until after she was forced to close "her" case.

Fourth, SA Wright allegedly harassed SA Reed by placing his name on the transfer list for Indianapolis after he knew that SA Reed has received a transfer to Indianapolis. This allegation is completely without merit because SA Reed encouraged SA Wright to seek a transfer to Indianapolis and told him that his chances of getting the transfer were good as a senior agent in that office was about to retire. Moreover, SA Wright's reasons for desiring to move to Indianapolis were completely independent of SA Reed. In fact, he had previously requested a transfer to Indianapolis when he was assigned to the Kansas City office;⁴⁵ and he had attended law school in Indianapolis and had many friends there. This allegation, like the others, is nothing more than retaliation by SA Reed for having to close "her" case.

18. SA Medernach's retaliation in this case against SA Wright is similar to her previous retaliation against another FBI agent. Previously, SA Reed made unfounded allegations against SSA Doug Phillips concerning certain conversations between her and SSA Phillips when

SSA Phillips told her to close a case. Taken together, the unsubstantiated allegations against SA Wright and the unfounded allegations against SSA Phillips are evidence that SA Reed has an established pattern of retaliating against other FBI agents when she is instructed to close a case. For this reason, she lacks credibility and her allegations against SA Wright lack merit and must be rejected.

19. There is an absence of evidence corroborating SA Medernach's allegations while, at the same time, there is evidence corroborating SA Wright's defense. At bottom, this case is nothing more than a "he said/she said" dispute instigated by an agent with a motive to falsify and a pattern of retaliation against other agents for being told to close "her" case.

Based on an incomplete factual record and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the OPR erroneously concluded that SA Medernach's retaliatory complaint had merit. Even more troubling, the OPR rushed to judgment in this case without even considering all the evidence submitted by SA Wright. Specifically, a copy of SA Wright's 42-page rebuttal (dated September 14, 1999) of SA Medernach's charges was not found in the Chicago file, indicating that it had not been forwarded to the FBIHQ OPR file and, therefore, it was not reviewed or considered by the OPR. In fact, on two separate occasions prior to SA Wright's interview concerning SA Medernach's allegations, OPR instructed OPR investigators not to accept SA Wright's 42-page rebuttal. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, none of SA Wright's ten witnesses identified in his rebuttal statement were interviewed prior to the OPR's decision. Moreover, the OPR failed to interview SA Reed concerning her own statements and actions that would contradict or undermine her sexual harassment allegations. Therefore, at the

very least, the OPR had an incomplete factual record upon which to make a decision in this case. This clearly violates SA Wright's right to due process of law and his administrative rights as an FBI agent.

This injustice to SA Wright is compounded by the nature and severity of the punishment handed down by the OPR. Ignoring the Chicago SAC's recommendation of "no time off", the OPR gave SA Wright a punishment of thirty (30) days suspension from duty without pay and one year probation. When he was informed of SA Wright's punishment, ASAC Brian Lewis of the Chicago office called the FBI assistant director in charge of the OPR unit. Lewis told the assistant director that he felt SA Wright's punishment was unfair and that he (Lewis) questioned the credibility of SA Reed.

Further, ignoring SA Wright's expertise in counterterrorism and despite the obvious need for experienced counter-terrorism agents in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the FBI has banished him from any counter-terrorism duties.⁴⁶ Excluding SA Wright from the FBI's counterterrorism efforts during this time of dire public need for agents experienced in counterterrorism indicates that it is more than retribution for SA Reed's sexual harassment charge. The FBI has been less than forthcoming concerning why SA Wright has been excluded from such an important role when he is so obviously well qualified for such a role. Nonetheless, it is clear that the FBI is retaliating against him for his criticism of the FBI's gross negligence regarding the threat of terrorism and actual terrorism in the United States.

V. CONCLUSION.

As shown above, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, it is abundantly clear that the FBI has been grossly negligent in failing to take seriously the threat of terrorism in the United States. Worse yet, not only has the FBI failed to aggressively pursue criminal investigations of terrorists in the United States, but it and its agents have thwarted ongoing criminal investigations of such terrorists, in particular the investigation conducted by SA Wright. Notwithstanding the unqualified success of SA Wright's investigation, the FBI has systematically rebuffed SA Wright's efforts to launch a national coordinated campaign to rid this country of terrorist activity. Unfortunately, the price for the FBI's massive abdication of its law enforcement function has been paid by the American people and, in particular by the victims and the families of the victims of the September 11th attacks and now also by the victims and families of the victims of the anthrax bio-terrorism crisis.

In retaliation for SA Wright's criticism of the FBI's dereliction of duty, the FBI has dispensed strong medicine to discredit him and, thereby, silence him. A threat was leveled by a DOJ official against SA Wright to his attorneys to prevent him from meeting with members of Congress during the week after September 11. However, the use of a baseless sexual harassment charge by another special agent with a motive to make false and misleading allegations against SA Wright cannot, and will not, succeed in silencing him. Moreover, the FBI's vindictive attempt to silence SA Wright by denying him fundamental due process of law will not be upheld in the light of day.


For all the reasons set forth above, the OPR must immediately take remedial action in the sexual harassment case against SA Wright to afford him the required due process of law by: (1)

interviewing all of SA Wright's witnesses; (2) re-interviewing the complainant and question her about all the mitigating factors and other evidence undermining the validity and credibility of her claim; (3) reviewing SA Wright's 42-page rebuttal (dated September 14, 1999) previously submitted and purportedly in the OPR file; and (4) permitting SA Wright to address, in writing, any new facts discovered or admissions made by the complainant that might arise in the course of these interviews. It is submitted that, after such remedial actions are taken, the OPR should reverse its prior decision against SA Wright and vacate the punishment previously given to him. Furthermore, in this time of national need, the FBI should immediately reassign SA Wright to, the important counterterrorism duties that he is so expertly capable of performing.

Finally, and equally important, the OIG should conduct an immediate, thorough and aggressive investigation of the FBI misconduct alleged herein and recommend appropriate civil and criminal penalties against those persons found to have obstructed justice and impeded the counter-terrorism activities of the FBI. These individuals are responsible, in part, for the terrorist events of September 11 and the current anthrax crisis because they thwarted U.S. counterterrorism activities.

ATTESTATION

I, Robert G. Wright, Jr., hereby declare and affirm, under the penalties of perjury, that the foregoing "Complaint To The Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of Professional Responsibility and the United States Department of Justice Office of Inspector General For Dereliction of Duty by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Failing to Investigate and Prosecute Terrorism and Obstruction of Justice in Retaliating Against Special Agent Robert Wright" is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Robert G. Wright, Jr.

STATE OF ILLINOIS)

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ss:

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COUNTY OF COOK)

Subscribed and sworn to me by Robert G. Wright, Jr., this 5th day of November,
2001. RGW.




Notary Public

ENDNOTES

1. Affidavit of Agent Robert Wright, filed on June 9, 1998, in the matter of United States of America vs. One 1997 E35 Ford Van See Paragraph 1. (See Tab #1, paragraph 1)
2. Id. (See Tab #1, paragraph 1).
3. The Journal of Counterterrorism & Security international, Summer 1998 issue, "The Chicago Forfeiture Case: Implications for Counterterrorism," by Gary Skulnik. (See Tab #2)
4. U.S. Department of Treasury Terrorist List pages 5 & 8. (See Tab #3, pp. 5, Line 3 & pp. 8, paragraph 2)
5. DallasNews.com - The Dallas Morning News, "U.S. ignored warning, former FBI officials says," by Carolyn Barta, 10/24/01. (See Tab #4, paragraph's 2&3)
6. (See Tab #1, paragraph 1)
7. Office of Professional Responsibility Notification dated 6/4/2001, titled SA Robert G. Wright, Jr., Chicago Division OPR Matter. (See Tab #5)
8. Office of Professional Responsibility Notification dated 10/11/2001, titled SA Robert G. Wright, Jr., Chicago Division OPR Matter. (See Tab #6)
9. (See Tab #1, paragraph 1)
10. The Jefferson City Post-Tribune, "Callahan rules Jones' civil rights not violated," by Mike Flanagan, 6/2/93. (See Tab #7)
11. Kansas City teletype to FBI Director - Subject: ...Robert G. Wright, Jr., Special Agent, FBI-Victim; AFO; OO:KC, dated, 7/93. (See Tab #8)
12. (See Tab #1, paragraph 1).
13. The Chicago Sunday Sun-Times, 'TERRORIST GET MILLIONS FROM AMERICA,' Pages 1, 8 and 9, by Dave Newbart and Chris Fusco, 9/30/01. (See Tab #9)
14. Id. (See Tab #9) .
15. (See Tab #1).
16. (See Tab #1, pp. 3, paragraph 4).
17. Id. (See Tab #1, pp. 25, paragraph 50 & pp. 28, paragraph's 56-62).
18. Id. (See Tab #1, pp. 11, paragraph's 21-35).

19. (See Tab #1, pp. 18, paragraph 37)
20. Performance Appraisal Report of Agent Robert G Wright, Jr. dated April 1998. (See Tab #10)
21. Performance Appraisal Report of Agent Robert G Wright, Jr. dated April 1997. (See Tab #11)
22. The Chicago Tribune, "Chicago link emerges as U.S. freezes more assets," by Robert Manor and Laurie Cohen, 10/15/01. (See Tab #12 & Tab #3, pp.6)
23. (See Tab #1, pp. 13, paragraph 27)
24. FBI Website - Frequently Asked Questions: Counterterrorism - What is the FBI's role in counterterrorism. (www.fbi.gov). (See Tab #13, pp. 1, paragraph 1)
25. Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress, pp. 10 & 11, 7/13/00, (<http://www.ict.org.il/documentdet.cfm?docid=36>). (See Tab #14, pp. 12, last paragraph)
26. New York Times article "Some Charities Suspected of Terrorist Role" by Judith Miller 2/19/00. (See Tab #15, pp. 3)
27. Id. (See Tab #15, pp. 2 & 3).
28. The Chicago Tribune, "Palestinian man found guilty of contempt charge - Case tied to federal Hamas probe," by Ruth E. Igoe, 10/21/2000. (See Tab #16, pp. 1, paragraph 2)
29. (See Tab #1, pp. 7, paragraph's 13 & 14).
30. Id. (See Tab #1, pp. 13, paragraph's 27-35)
31. EEO 'Signed Sworn Statement' of Special Agent Robert G. Wright, Jr., page 3 of 11, 3/21/00. (See Tab #17)
32. (See Tab #12, pp. 2)
33. (See Tab #3)
34. The New Yorker, "Annals of National Security," by Seymore M. Hersh, 10/22/01. (See Tab #18)
35. The Times, London New York, "Laden family snaps ties with US business major," by Chris Ayres, 10/24/01. (See Tab #19)

36. The Wall Street Journal, "Bin Laden Family Could Profit From a Jump In Defense Spending Due to Ties to U.S. Bank," by Daniel Golden, James Bandler and Marcus Walker, 9/27/01. (See Tab #20)

37. Performance Appraisal Report of Agent Robert G Wright, Jr. dated November 1997. (See Tab #11)

38. Performance Appraisal Report of Agent Robert G Wright, Jr. dated April 1998. (See Tab #10)

39. Performance Appraisal Report of Agent Robert G Wright, Jr. dated April 1999. (See Tab #21)

40. Performance Appraisal Report of Agent Robert G Wright, Jr. dated April 2000. (See Tab #22)

41. Electronic Communication from SAC Kathleen McChesney regarding the Assignment of SA Robert G. Wright from Terrorism Squad (CT-1) to Applicant Squad (A-3), dated 8/16/99. (See Tab #23)

42. Office of Professional Responsibility Notification dated 7/23/1999, titled SA Robert G. Wright, Jr., Chicago Division OPR Matter. (See Tab #24)

43. Civil Complaint Robert G. Wright, Jr. Plaintiff vs. Karen Medernach, Defendant, In the Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois, ¶'s 1 and 4, June 2001. (See Tab #25, pp. 1, paragraph's 1& 4)

44. The Chicago Sun-Times, "FBI agents take fight over duties to court," by Abdon M. Pallasch, 6/19/01. (See Tab #26)

45. (See Tab #8).

46. Note from supervisor to SA Robert Wright dated, 9/25/01. (See Tab #27)

(3)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

NOTIFICATION

DATE: 7/23/99

TO: SAC, CHICAGO DIVISION

FROM: OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

TITLE: SA ROBERT G. WRIGHT, JR.
CHICAGO DIVISION
OPR MATTER

Conduct no investigation until so requested by OPR. Initiation and conduct of this inquiry and adjudication as necessary should be closely coordinated with OPR.

On 7/22/99 an OPR inquiry was initiated regarding an allegation that captioned employee has engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment against a female SA assigned to a joint Chicago/Milwaukee Division investigation.

____ You are requested not to inform captioned employee of the initiation of this inquiry or provide him/her with the below described forms until requested to do so by OPR.

X You are requested to provide captioned employee with a copy of this notice and of the attached forms, "Explanation of Procedures in the FBI's Disciplinary Process" and Disclosure of Information to Attorneys," and to return this notice signed and dated by the presenting official, establishing that you have advised the employee that:

- (1) He/she will be interviewed regarding this matter;
- (2) He/she has the opportunity to have an attorney represent him/her in this matter subject to the limitations set forth in the above forms; and
- (3) The Employee Assistance Program (EAP) is always available and provides free, confidential, professional assistance to employees and their family members.

On _____, this matter was referred to the Adjudication Unit, OPR, for review and appropriate action. You are requested to so inform captioned employee.

Presenting Official: [Signature] 8/4/99

Return Copy to OPR

Employee Signature: Robert Wright

8/4/99

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

(2)- Field Office/Division
1 - 263-HQ- 1296903

(OPR Case Supervisor: Woerner) wcw
(OPR/FBIHQ: Room 11102, Ext. 6470)

(Tab 24)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION

ROBERT G. WRIGHT, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAREN MEDERNACH,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF DEMANDS
TRIAL BY JURY

COMPLAINT

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Robert G. Wright, Jr. ("Wright") by and through his Attorney, David P. Schippers, and for his Complaint in two counts against the Defendant, Karen Medernach ("Medernach"), states as follows:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of Indiana and, at all relevant times, was employed as a Special Agent ("S/A") of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI").
2. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was stationed in the Chicago District of the FBI in Chicago, Illinois.
3. Defendant Medernach is a citizen and resident of the State of Indiana, and was, at all times, employed as an S/A of the FBI.
4. At all relevant times, Defendant was stationed in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin District office of the FBI.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This Court has Jurisdiction over the subject matter and

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has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-209 in that the Defendant committed many of the tortious acts alleged herein in the State of Illinois.

6. Venue is proper in Cook County, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-101, in that the sole Defendant is a non-resident of the State of Illinois.

FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT ONE

Intentional Infliction
Of Mental Distress

7. At the time of the events complained of herein, Plaintiff had been an agent of the FBI for nine years. He enjoyed a reputation as a hard working, dedicated and competent agent, and enjoyed the respect and admiration of his fellow agents, of his supervisors and of those with whom he came in contact professionally.

8. As a consequence, Plaintiff expected to succeed as an FBI Agent, to receive promotions and eventually to retire honorably and with his reputation unsullied.

9. At the time of the events complained of herein, Wright was assigned to the FBI International Terrorist Squad, centered in Chicago, Illinois, and had been working in that capacity since 1993.

10. In or about 1995, Wright developed and implemented an investigative plan to identify and neutralize foreign Middle

Eastern terrorist organizations operating throughout the United States.

11. During the course of his investigation, Wright identified a resident of the United States who was directly involved in the terrorist activities in the United States and elsewhere. Wright opened a case and began an intense and in depth investigation of that individual's financial and other activities.

12. In or about 1999, Wright became aware that Medernach had also opened a criminal case in Milwaukee concerning the same individual and his activity.

13. Medernach demanded that her case be given precedence and that she be assigned to be the lead agent, with the Chicago investigation as secondary.

14. In order to avoid confusion and duplication of effort, the FBI decided that the investigation must be coordinated out of one office.

15. As a result, in July 1999, a meeting was arranged and an agreement was reached between Milwaukee and the Chicago Special Agents In Charge.

16. On the morning of July 20, 1999, Medernach was instructed to close out her case and Wright was told to proceed with his investigation.

17. Medernach became extremely angry. She complained for

two hours and bemoaned that Wright "had won." She held Wright responsible for her being instructed to close out her case.

18. At all relevant times there was in effect Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 USC 2000E, et. seq.)

19. Pursuant to that statute, it was, and is unlawful to engage in discrimination or harassment in the workplace on the basis of gender.

20. Pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, the FBI had in place, at all relevant times, a policy, rules and regulations prohibiting sexual discrimination and harassment and providing discipline for any agent engaging in such activity.

21. As a young, unmarried male agent, Wright was especially vulnerable to false and malicious charges of sexual discrimination and harassment.

22. As a result of the foregoing, Medernach knew that she possessed power and influence, the exercise which would damage Wright in his profession, would humiliate him, would cause him public embarrassment, and would result in extreme mental distress to him.

23. On July 22, 1999, two days after she was ordered to close her case and defer to the Chicago investigation being conducted by Wright, Medernach filed with the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility a false and malicious charge against Wright in which she alleged that he had engaged in a "pattern of

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sexual harassment."

24. The false and malicious charges were made with the specific intent to cause, or in reckless disregard of the possibility of causing Wright severe emotional distress because Medernach knew that the mere charge itself would humiliate Plaintiff, publicly embarrass him in his work environment, and would seriously damage his reputation and career in the FBI.

25. The false and malicious charge and the intentional infliction of mental distress were intended to punish the Plaintiff for depriving the Defendant of what she considered to be her case.

26. The conduct of the Defendant as stated above was extreme and went beyond all bounds of decency. The conduct was, accordingly, outrageous within the purview of the laws of the State of Illinois.

27. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's intentional and outrageous conduct as alleged, the Plaintiff was humiliated and publicly embarrassed. He suffered irremediable injury to his personal and professional reputation, was subjected to a full investigation and disciplinary proceedings by the FBI and was relieved of his cases in the area of international terrorism.

28. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's intentional and outrageous conduct, Plaintiff has in fact

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suffered sever and permanent mental and emotional distress as was specifically intended by the Defendant when she engaged in that outrageous conduct.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Robert G. Wright, Jr. prays judgment against the Defendant, Karen Medernach, for damages in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand dollars (\$150,000.00) and such other relief as this Court deems just in the premises.

COUNT TWO

Intentional Interference with Prospective Advantage

29. Plaintiff realleges paragraph 1 through 7, both inclusive of Count One as paragraph 29 of Count Two.

30. Plaintiff realleges paragraph 9 through 17, both inclusive of Count One as paragraph 30 of Count Two.

31. Plaintiff, prior to the events complained of herein, enjoyed an excellent reputation for competence, ability and professionalism. He was highly thought of by his superiors, his fellow law enforcement agents and those with whom he dealt as an FBI agent. He always received highly favorable appraisals.

32. As a result of his "exceptional" work record and excellent reputation, Plaintiff reasonably anticipated that he would obtain prospective advantages as an agent. Specifically, he expected to move upward within the FBI and obtain both financial and professional advantages and retire honorably with a

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substantial pension.

33. At all relevant times, Defendant, herself a Special Agent of the FBI, knew that the Plaintiff anticipated such prospective advantage of professional and financial advancement within the FBI.

34. Defendant also knew, or should have known, that a charge of sexual harassment made against Wright would humiliate him, cause severe damage to his personal and professional reputation and would most likely ruin his career within the FBI.

35. With full knowledge of the likely result and with the specific intent to interfere with and harm Plaintiff's reasonable expectation of future advantage, on July 22, 1999, Defendant filed a charge of sexual harassment with the FBI/OPR.

36. The actions by the Defendant as alleged in paragraph 35, were done with malice in that:

- a) The Defendant knew her charges to be false;
- b) The Defendant knew that her charges would result in a disciplinary investigation;
- c) The Defendant acted with the specific intent to destroy the Plaintiff's career; and
- d) The Defendant filed the false charges two days after the Plaintiff prevailed in a work related jurisdictional dispute over the Defendant.

37. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendant, as alleged, and as the Defendant specifically intended, the Plaintiff was publicly humiliated, and embarrassed. He suffered irreparable injury to his personal and professional

reputation, was subjected to a full investigation resulting in a recommendation of disciplinary action against him and was relieved of his duties in the field of international terrorism.

38. As a direct and proximate result of the false and malicious statement and actions by the Defendant and the actions of the FBI caused by such statements and actions, Plaintiff's career as a Special Agent of the FBI has been destroyed. He will never attain the prospective advantage that he enjoyed prior to the Defendant's false and malicious statements and actions in that he will no longer advance financially and professionally within the FBI as he had previously anticipated.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Robert G. Wright, Jr., prays that judgment be entered against the Defendant, Karen Medernach, for damages in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$150,000.00) and such other relief as this Court deems just in the premises.

Respectfully submitted,


DAVID P. SCHIPPERS, Attorney for
Plaintiff

SCHIPPERS & BAILEY
20 North Clark Street
Suite 3600
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 263-1200
Atty. No. 12222


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VERIFICATION

ROBERT G. WRIGHT, JR., being duly sworn, on oath deposes and states that he has read the above and foregoing Two Count Complaint, that he is familiar with the facts alleged therein and that those facts are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.



ROBERT G. WRIGHT, JR.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this 12th day
of June 2001


NOTARY PUBLIC



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- ▶ John H. Garvey
- ▶ Ann
- ▶ David
- ▶ David
- ▶ David
- ▶ David
- ▶ David
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FBI agents take fight over duties to court

June 19, 2001

BY ABDON M. PALLASCH LEGAL AFFAIRS REPORTER

A spy vs. spy conflict in the Chicago and Milwaukee offices of the FBI spilled into the courthouse Monday as one FBI agent sued another.

Robert G. Wright, an agent on the FBI's International Terrorist Squad in Chicago, was investigating a suspected terrorist in 1999 when he learned that a Milwaukee-based FBI agent, Karen Medernach, was investigating the same person, Wright said in a suit filed Monday in Cook County Circuit Court.

FBI agents from Milwaukee and Chicago held a meeting and decided to make Wright the lead agent on the case, the suit states.

"Medernach became extremely angry," and two days after she was ordered to close her case, she filed a charge of sexual harassment against Wright with the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility.

The office investigated the complaint and recommended disciplinary action against Wright, the suit states. He was relieved of his duties in the field of international terrorism. Wright is still an agent, but his career has been "destroyed," the suit states.

Wright's attorney is David P. Schippers, who gained fame as investigative counsel for the House Judiciary Committee during the impeachment proceedings against former President Bill Clinton.

Medernach could not be reached for comment. Wright demands \$150,000 from her for intentional infliction of mental distress, among other claims.

The suit does not name the individual the FBI was focusing on in July 1999, when the actions in question took place.

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Tab 26

9/25/01

PFH:pfh

ASAC Patrick J. Daly advised that when SA Robert G. Wright, Jr. arrives back at work ~~REDACTED~~ he is not to work 265A-NY-208350. ASAC Daly also said that he, Daly, would discuss this with SA Wright upon Wright's return.

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- (1) - SA Wright
- 1 - SRA 2 Personnel Folder SA Wright

SA Wright R6W
Bob - please see me
re this upon
your return
JH 9/26/01